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Summary 
 
The paper applies modified Oaxaca-type analyses on the eighteen available waves of the 
British Household Panel Survey to decompose the wage gap among full time employees 
from either side of the North-South divide and identify its components that can be attributed 
to measurable worker- and labour market characteristics, and the part due to differences in 
the returns to these endowments. Further, by applying Juhn, Murphy and Pierce’s (1991) 
methodology, it is analysed, how changes in these underlying factors could explain the one 
quarter decline in the wage gap over the 1991 – 2009 period.  
The paper confirms the existence of a differential treatment effect by showing that only one 
fifth of the wage gap can be explained by observable differences. The magnitude of the 
unexplainable coefficient effect is so large, that the remarkable improvements in Northern 
occupational structure and human capital levels over the period could only translate into an 
actual decline in the wage gap, because it coincided with a period of increasing inequality 
among Northern occupational wage premia, which – as a by-product – increased the 
average Northern wage and this way counterbalanced the effects of the increasing Southern 
returns to experience, that alone could have increased the initial pay gap by half. 
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Figure 1. Gross disposable per capita annual income and percentage of UK average 
 
Source: ONS (2010a) 
 
 
 
“The north-south divide is no longer a vague idea […] We have enough 
information on life chances, health and wealth to say where the line lies and 
what is happening to it.”  
 – Sunday Times, 15 August 2010 
 6
1. Introduction 
 
In its most recent bulletin, the Office for National Statistics (2010a) – inadvertently – maps 
the North-South divide by its favourite measure: average per capita labour and non-labour 
income after taxes, housing costs and benefit receipts. The same bulletin reports that while 
in 1995 the most and least affluent regions – London and Yorkshire & Humber – were 20% 
above and 9% below the national average, by 2009 the gap widened to 28% and 12% 
respectively, amounting to an over £10,000 difference in annual incomes. All major 
newspapers – broadsheet and tabloid alike – cited the figures, just as they did in the past 
forty years with any other socio-economic data that pointed to the dichotomy between 
North and South. As a result, few would question the existence of the divide, yet the 
emergence of the phenomenon owes much more to the populist press than to any robust 
economic analysis.  
The Severn – Wash line1 has been separating income and wage levels, employment 
opportunities, health conditions, life expectancy, educational attainment and house prices 
for a century (Doran 2004, Baker and Billinge 2004). However, only after the 1970s’ 
industrial restructuring, which resulted in record levels of cross-regional income and 
unemployment disparities (Hudson 1989, Armstrong and Taylor 1987), did the North-
South divide become widely discussed. While there is hardly any week without being 
mentioned in the national press, there has been markedly little research attempting to 
evaluate the true extent of such a divide in any robust way, yet alone in a dynamic setting. 
This paper adds to the existing literature by performing static and dynamic decomposition 
                                                  
1
 The mainstream literature defines the Severn – Wash line as the North-South dividing line (Baker and 
Billinge 2004). Accordingly, the South is defined as South East, South West, (Greater) London and East 
Anglia, while the North includes East Midlands, West Midlands, Yorkshire & Humber, North West and North 
East. In the past, a few authors have classed East Midlands as part of the South, however in the light of recent 
socio-economic data, its Northern status is no longer questioned (Dorling 2010). 
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analyses on eighteen years’ (1991-2009) panel data to investigate the forces behind 
England’s North-South average wage gap – the most significant gap within the North-
South divide context1 – and the change of their magnitudes over time. The paper adopts 
novel econometric techniques and proposes a unique three-fold specification to correct for a 
number of shortcomings of the original Oaxaca method, such as getting biased estimates on 
the relative size of the endowment and coefficient effects’ individual components caused by 
both the excluded categorical variables and the inevitable choice of an implicit non-
discriminatory norm. The study seeks to identify whether there is an adjusted wage gap – a 
residual left over after controlling for measurable regional worker and labour market 
characteristics –, and along what dimensions is the gap changing between 1991 and 2009 
both in terms of endowments and the returns to these attributes; as only such a residual 
could be sensibly called the North-South divide, meaning the gap between wages of 
comparable workers. By estimating the magnitude of the unexplainable part of the pay gap 
at different inter-decile ranges in the wage distribution, the paper will conclude by 
proposing a method to evaluate the robustness of its findings across the whole wage 
distribution. 
                                                  
1
 In the first wave of the British Household Panel Survey, the North-South wage gap among full time 
employees expressed as a percentage of the Southern figure is higher than any other measures such as the 
monthly or annual income gap, even after including non-labour income sources to the latter.  
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2. Literature review           
 
Neoclassical theory suggests that regional income inequality may arise due to temporary 
demand/supply disequilibrium (Blackaby and Manning 1990); compensating differentials 
for job characteristics, regional price levels, unemployment or crowding (Rosen 1986, 
Bergmann 1971); or caused by institutions, such as collective bargaining, efficiency wages 
or employment legislation, through their effects on labour market flexibility. The theory 
suggests that after controlling for all such determinants, and provided that sufficient time is 
given1, factor prices will equalize for comparable workers and the resulting wages should 
be inter-regionally invariant. Competing theories, on the other hand, such as the Big Push 
model by Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) explain regional income inequalities from a very 
different perspective. These propose that regional disparities may not decrease over time as 
more prosperous regions build on the scale-economies and knowledge spill-overs of their 
concentrating industries (Lucas 1988) leading to the emergence of clusters of economic 
miracles (Porter 2000) which, reinforced by a unidirectional movement of workers, could 
initiate vicious circles of self-reinforcing relative decline in the less affluent regions. It is 
very difficult to model wage determination by such forces in micro-studies, therefore most 
analyses build on the neoclassical model and leave these effects to the intercept.  
The study of income dispersion attracted substantial interest following a significant rise in 
earnings inequality in most OECD countries from 1978 onwards both between and within 
various groups of workers (see Katz and Autor 1999 for a survey). Most studies trying to 
explain the strong positive correlation between income percentile rank and real increases in 
earnings attributed the phenomenon to growing returns to labour market skills, most 
                                                  
1
 The subsequent analysis covering the 1991-2009 period, whose end points are at similar stages in the 
business cycle, is assumed to be able to filter out potential short run disequilibria. 
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importantly to education and experience. Explanations included demand and supply shifts 
(Freeman and Katz 1994), the growing international trade (Borjas and Ramey 1995) as well 
as institutional factors (Nickel and Layard 1998). It has been observed that real earnings of 
skilled workers kept rising markedly even though their supply increased at the same time. 
The seemingly paradoxical relationship was reconciled by Katz and Murphy (1992) who 
suggested that demand shifts, driven by the increase in skilled workers’ productivity, must 
have been higher than the downward pressure on wages caused by the growing proportion 
of such workers. Machin (1995) and Autor et al. (1998) argued that the rise in skilled 
workers’ productivity was induced by a skill-biased technological change, which can also 
explain why real earnings of unskilled workers remained relatively stagnant for long 
periods of time. Not only had the so-called skill upgrade caused a drop in demand for the 
low skilled, but growing international trade allowed the substitution of these workers’ 
labour for cheaper imports, while declining unions and industrial restructuring further 
worsened their position by forcing the unskilled into sectors with low-average high-
variance wage distribution. Several studies have suggested that bi-directional feedback 
effect mechanisms may aggravate pay differences over time, and also across regions, either 
through the well-established link between family income and educational attainment 
(Machin and Vignoles 2004), or through the industry structure affecting regional 
development in an unbalanced fashion by cumulatively distorting the inter-regional skill 
distribution (Chen et al. 2010).  
Despite the explosion in the number of academic papers examining regional income 
inequalities, average income differentials – yet alone the North-South wage gap – received 
markedly little attention from academics. Three different reasons could be behind the 
phenomenon. First of all, several authors, such as Wilsher and Cassidy (1987 p25) argued 
that “[t]here is no Severn-Wash line separating the haves and have-nots.”, suggesting that 
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North and South are far from being that homogenous as indicated by the concept of the 
North-South divide, and therefore no analysis at this aggregation would be meaningful. 
Also, by witnessing the record increases in within-group inequalities, influential writers 
like Shorrocks (1984), Jenkins (1994) or DiNardo et al. (1996) advocated the study of 
income inequalities across the whole income distribution, as it would convey more 
information than analysing averages1. The third reason why the study of the North-South 
divide might have been neglected could be due to American findings on the US North-
South divide. During the 1960s and 1970s numerous papers using pre-Mincerian income 
models demonstrated the existence of the divide by showing that a large part of the North-
South income gap cannot be explained by measurable differences between the regions 
(Scully 1969). When subsequent studies re-performed these estimations applying more 
sophisticated modelling and Oaxaca-type decomposition techniques, they all found that 
after taking worker characteristics, labour market differences and regional price levels into 
account, the remaining North-South income gap is no longer statistically significant 
(Sahling and Smith 1983).  
The Oaxaca (1973) - Blinder (1973) approach was originally devised to calculate Becker’s 
(1971) discrimination coefficient and to analyse the gender pay gap in a meaningful way 
after controlling for observable differences (see Olsen et al 2009 for a UK update). The 
technique became the predominant tool in analyses of pay differentials aiming to identify 
the underlying sources of such disparities by quantifying the individual effects of the 
distribution of worker and labour market characteristics and their different returns on the 
pay gap. Several augmentations have been proposed over the years making it possible to 
                                                  
1
 While not disagreeing with the proponents of studies of the second moment of income variance, it has to be 
noted that they are simply not substitutes for what this paper aims to do. This analysis can provide a rich set 
of unique insights into the causes of wage inequality for the representative worker in a much greater 
disaggregation than would be possible with the alternative approach. This paper also aims to bridge the gap 
between the two theoretical approaches by departing from the means and analysing the findings across the 
whole distribution. 
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decompose over-time changes in differentials (Juhn, Murphy and Pierce 1991); gaps 
between inter-quantile ranges or at specific percentile points (Makepeace et al. 1999, 
Buchinsky 1994, Machado and Mata 2005); as well as to analyse measures of distributions 
instead of mean-differences (Yun 2006). The method had a huge influence on micro 
analyses, and is even featured in court hearings.  
The extensive search on EconLit and RePEc revealed only two papers that performed an 
Oaxaca-type decomposition analysis on England’s North-South income differential, of 
which none applied the over-time extension. Blackaby and Manning (1990) by analysing a 
1975 and a 1982 dataset, found that only half of 1975’s approximately 6% annual income 
gap could be explained by the more favourable occupational, industrial and educational 
structure of the South, and only a third of 1982’s similar magnitude monthly income 
differential could be attributed to superior Southern endowments. Their results “only partly 
support the notion of a North-South divide”, however they suggest: “much may be learned 
by combining a sequence of cross-section data sets over time” (p524). Blackaby and 
Murphy (1995) by performing the same analysis on a 1983 income data, draw a similar 
conclusion by suggesting that the 2.4% income gap residual, remaining after endowments 
are controlled for, is not large enough to be inconsistent with neoclassical theory. 
Only a few studies from outside England have adopted the Oaxaca method to analyse inter-
regional pay disparities. Takahashi (2007), Pereira and Galego (2007), Motellon et al. 
(2009), Garcia and Molina (2002) and Vieira et al. (2006) use the technique to decompose 
Vietnamese, Portuguese and Spanish regional wage differentials; while Kidd and Shannon 
(2001), Davila and Mora (2005), Blau and Kahn (1997) and Pereira and Galego (2007) 
applies the extension of the model to examine over-time changes in inter-regional wage 
differentials.
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3. Methods 
 
While the stark contrast between Southern and Northern incomes is visible on the map, it is 
not so obvious whether Southern workers earn more because there is a North-South divide 
per se, or because on average Southern workers have more favourable characteristics, or 
because these characteristics are rewarded more in the Southern labour market. The paper is 
going to decompose the wage gap to these distinct components to measure their relative 
contribution year-by-year over the period, and also – and more importantly from a policy 
perspective – it will decompose the over-time change in the wage gap to the underlying 
changes in these forces. The Oaxaca (1973) – Blinder (1973) decomposition analysis can 
explain the North-South mean wage gap in terms of differing group attributes and the 
unexplained differences in the returns to these characteristics; and it can also quantify the 
effect on the wage gap of each underlying human capital and labour market characteristic 
component building up these forces. In the original discrimination context the applicability 
of the technique relies heavily on a sound model specification, as after controlling for 
observable differences, the remaining residual is the term identified as discrimination. It is 
easy to see that in any such model the residual will be greatly affected by the chosen 
control variables, which in turn depends on one’s judgement on what causes discrimination 
and what does not. Due to this property and the inevitable omitted variable bias, critics 
argue that the Oaxaca method unavoidably overestimates discrimination as all uncontrolled 
effects will then be picked up by the intercept, which, by the very construction of the 
model, is then interpreted as discrimination. Fortunately, the main purpose of this paper is 
not to report the absolute size of the differential treatment effect, but to identify the 
underlying sources of the pay gap and their relative magnitude, and therefore these 
implications are less valid in the present context. Others suggest that the Oaxaca method 
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actually underestimates discrimination as real discrimination starts earlier than 
employment, therefore using it with wage equations from a self-selected sample is 
insufficient to determine the true extent of the concern. On a similar note – even 
emphasised by Oaxaca (2007) –, if one could control for all variation in the wages, then the 
differential treatment, defined as the residual, could be completely eliminated. In the 
context of the North-South divide, this limitation must be addressed. By controlling for 
industry structure it is implicitly assumed that the different regional sectoral-mix is entirely 
explainable by workers’ voluntary choices, arriving to spurious findings which explain the 
wage gap by – say – Northern workers’ reluctance to work in finance. Although controlling 
for it, differences in the industry-mix will not be discussed as part of the endowment gap, as 
industrial crowding or segregation into lower paid industries are strongly influenced by a 
given industry structure, making it a possible source of the differential treatment effect. 
  
3.1 Wage equation 
The Oaxaca method works by measuring differences between regressor means and their 
coefficients after estimating a pair of earnings equations. As real world wage determination 
cannot be directly observed, it will be modelled as a stochastic process separately for 
Northern (N) and Southern (S) workers year-by-year, assuming that the wage (w) is 
determined by j number of worker and labour market characteristics: 
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In models (E1) and (E2) wages are thought to be exogenously determined by an X row 
vector of worker, job and regional labour market characteristics such as human capital, 
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gender, occupation or industry-mix, j  is a column vector of the parameters reflecting the 
marginal returns to each wage determinant, 0  is the intercept, while u is a random error 
term with expected value of zero allowing for the effect of natural ability or luck.  
 
3.2 Sample selection 
As the dependent variable is not observed for individuals who cannot get an offer above 
their reservation wage, the regression would not be based on a random sample but on a 
censored, self-selected one. If there is a systematic relation between some of the wage 
determinants and individuals’ probability to work with these characteristics, the estimated 
coefficients in the wage equation would become inconsistent, as the error terms of the wage 
equation and the participation function fitted on individuals’ probability to work would 
correlate. Due to the comparatively higher labour force participation of male workers such 
bias is not assumed to significantly affect their wage determination. Following Heckman 
(1976, 1979) and Wooldridge (2002) to correct sample selection bias, the probability that a 
woman will self-select and makes her wage observable ( 1iI ) is estimated from the entire 
sample, by modelling it as a function of iZ , a vector of characteristics affecting 
participation only (S1):  
     )(0Pr1Pr iiiii ZZI                                                                          (S1) 
 
The selectivity term   (or the Inverse Mills’ Ratio), on which the hypothetical wage 
equation is then made conditional, can be constructed for women’s observations from the 
estimated coefficients of the probit model. Leaving   out would constitute to an omitted 
variable bias as it correlates with the vector of the true wage determinants (Heckman 1979).  
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    iijiiijiii XIuXIw   00 1|1|                                        (S2) 
Where     
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ˆ
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In the corrected wage equation (S2),   is the standard deviation of u;   is the correlation 
between   and u;   is a new error term with expected value of zero, and   is the ratio of 
the density function of the standard normal distribution to the cumulative normal 
distribution function, reflecting the estimated probability that a woman with specific 
characteristics mix will self-select to work. Including it will control for the non-random 
nature of self-selection, therefore the pooled-gender OLS will give consistent estimates on 
the parameter vector.  
 
3.3 Oaxaca decomposition 
Following the estimation of the wage function-pairs – and provided that the null hypothesis 
of no systematic difference between Northern and Southern coefficient vectors can be 
rejected – it is possible to break down the wage gap into an endowment effect (E), a part 
due to characteristic-differences between the representative Northern and Southern 
workers, and into a coefficient effect (C), a part due to differences in the returns to these 
endowments. The latter term, which also includes the differences between the intercepts, 
identifies the residual wage gap after measurable variation in the mean endowments has 
been controlled for, or in other words, the adjusted North-South divide.  
Oaxaca’s (1973) original specification (O1) weights the endowment gap by the more 
advantaged group’s coefficient vector while the coefficient gap is weighted by the vector of 
the disadvantaged group’s average endowment. In the current context, the first term 
implicitly assumes that workers in the South receive a fair compensation while their 
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counterparts in the North are underpaid – an assumption adopted by most studies of its kind 
despite of a major flaw in its formulation.  
        CEXXXww NNjSjNSSjNSNS   ˆˆˆˆˆ 00                                )1(O  
 
As Jones and Kelley (1984) argue, weighting the coefficient gap by the less advantaged 
group’s endowment, as in (O1), is appropriate only if the policy attempts to close the gap 
by decreasing the more advantaged group’s endowment levels. Clearly, there are not many 
contexts where this would be the case. To address the specification issue, an alternative 
form (O2) has been suggested which, however, by allowing its coefficient gap to be tested 
at the Southern endowment vector, effectively forces its endowment term to be weighted by 
the Northern returns to wage determinants. Such a treatment creates an implicit assumption 
that Northern workers are paid fairly while their Southern counterparts receive unduly high 
compensation – an assumption somewhat difficult to justify, which may explain why, 
despite its more sensible treatment of the coefficient effect, specification (O2) remains 
seldom used, and the few authors who feature it, do so only to demonstrate the robustness 
of their (O1) results. 
        CEXXXww SNjSjNSNjNSNS   ˆˆˆˆˆ 00                               )2(O  
 
Oaxaca and Ransom (1988) point out that while both specifications will identify the most 
important components of the wage gap, the estimates of their relative contributions will be 
dependent on the chosen non-discriminatory norm, or in other words: the weighting of the 
endowment effect. They attempt to address the theoretical difficulty to select one reference 
over its alternative by proposing a generalised specification (O3) where by including both 
possible weights and weighting them by   and  1  respectively, where  1,0 , they 
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offer the construction of an infinite number of non-discriminatory norms anywhere in-
between the vectors of the North and the South including the two extremes, where 1  
would form (O1), while equation (O2) could be given by setting 0 . In the same 
framework, Cotton (1988) suggests averaging the vectors ( 5.0 ), while Reimers (1983) 
recommends making   equal to the relative population size of the corresponding region.  
      CEXXXXww NSNSNSNSNS   )1(ˆˆˆ)1(ˆ 1     )3(O  
 
Others, like Neumark (1988) who used the coefficient vector from the two groups’ pooled 
regression as the non-discriminatory reference ( *ˆ ), suggest that such a vector does not 
have to be constructed from the analysed groups’ coefficients, it can be any external 
references, such as a third region’s vector, as in (O4). 
        CEXXXXww NNSSNSNS   ˆ*ˆ*ˆˆ*ˆ                          )4(O                      
 
Unfortunately, so far none of the specifications offered a definitive solution to the 
sensitivity of the relative size of the endowment effect to the chosen non-discriminatory 
reference. Another – very closely related – problem with all two-fold specifications is that 
they do not permit weighting the effects by the same group’s coefficient and average 
endowment vectors. In the current context it is not only reasonable to multiply the 
coefficient gap by the Southern endowments due to the direction of the policy, which aims 
to adjust Northern human capital (and even industrial) composition to Southern levels, but 
to use Southern coefficients also to evaluate the relative importance of inter-regional 
differences in the wage determinants – not offered by any previous arrangements. It can 
                                                  
1
 From this point the intercept gap  NS 00 ˆˆ    is not stated separately but included in the coefficient gap (C). 
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reasonably be assumed that returns to wage determinants are negative and concave 
functions of their supply conditions. If the lower Northern supply of favourable wage 
determinants, like degree-level qualification, makes Northern wage premia relatively higher 
for these characteristics, extrapolating Northern endowments to Southern levels by using 
the North’s coefficients will inevitably overestimate the size of the endowment effect and 
the possible decrease in the wage gap upon successful convergence in the endowment 
levels. Even with the presence of the widely reported rise in skills premia, this non-linearity 
can be best approximated in a linear model by evaluating the relative size of the 
endowment gap using Southern coefficients. 
To satisfy both requirements the reverse1 of Jann’s (2008) three-fold specification (O5) will 
be adopted by using the Southern coefficient and endowment vectors to weight the 
endowment and coefficient gaps respectively and by specifying an interaction term (CE) in 
order to separately identify the primary components’ pure effects. With some manipulation, 
it is easy to see that the reason why the relative size of the effects was always dependent on 
the chosen non-discriminatory norm, is that in all previous two-fold specifications the (CE) 
component, which picks up the effect of the interaction by the endowment and coefficient 
gaps, was deducted from either the endowment (O1) or the coefficient effect (O2) 
depending on the chosen reference group. By stating the (usually opposite signed) 
interaction term separately, the true magnitude of the pure effect, of which it is grouped to, 
can be estimated. 
         CECEXXXXXww NSNSSNSSNSNS   ˆˆˆˆˆ            (O5)
                                                  
1
 Jann’s (2008) default model would weight both terms by the less advantaged group’s vectors. 
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3.4 Identification issue 
Jones (1983) showed that while in an ordinary wage equation the interpretation of any 
coefficient without a natural starting point (such as continuous variables with non-zero start 
or any set of dummies where their contribution is estimated from the excluded category) is 
relatively straightforward, it is less so in the Oaxaca decomposition context. It is because 
the intercept gap – which is by construction interpreted as part of the unexplained 
differential treatment effect – will pick up the gap between the returns to all excluded 
endowment categories and similarly the returns to the continuous endowment variables up 
to their starting point, which in turn will also bias the estimate of the included variables’ 
individual contribution to the coefficient gap.  Whereas continuous variables with non-zero 
starting point can be easily recoded, there is no obvious treatment for categorical variables 
due to potential collinearity.  While Oaxaca and Ransom (1997) prove that the aggregate 
estimates of the endowment and coefficient effects’ size will remain unbiased, they too 
acknowledge that this particular issue makes it impossible to evaluate the relative size of 
the components within these major categories such as the individual contribution of any 
one dummy variable, which would be essential in the current analysis. To correct the bias, 
Yun’s (2005) averaging method will be applied, which allows the estimation of all 
categorical variables’ individual effect on the pay gap in an Oaxaca decomposition context. 
The technique works by estimating every possible wage equation-combinations with 
different excluded categories1, and then for every variable (including the intercept) all 
iterations are averaged. This way, the groups of coefficients will be constrained to sum to 
zero, so they will express deviation from their common mean instead of the excluded 
category, making it possible to include all categories in the subsequent decomposition 
equation. The given intercept will indicate the hypothetical wage of a worker who equally 
                                                  
1
 Jann (2008) offers a module for the Stata implementation. 
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bears each characteristic from every sets, and therefore normalised in the sense that it will 
not pick up the differential return to any one category.  
 
3.5 Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1991) decomposition 
While the static Oaxaca analysis at any one point in time can examine the existence of the 
adjusted North-South wage gap, the results may not be easily interpretable from a policy 
perspective, as – due to four different over-time forces – the method is incapable of telling 
how much change in the overall wage gap could be predicted by over-time changes in the 
underlying factors. If the wage gap is found to decrease over time, it could be caused by an 
improving relative skill-mix in the North, or by a deteriorating relative skill-mix in the 
South, or it may be explained by falling relative returns to wage determinants in the South, 
or by rising relative returns in the North. From a policy perspective the implication of the 
different effects could not be more different, therefore any meaningful decomposition must 
be capable of identifying these distinct forces. The traditional Oaxaca decomposition 
cannot fulfil this requirement, as it divides the wage gap into endowment and coefficient 
effects, which are both weighted differences, and therefore one cannot be sure whether an 
over-time change in the – say – endowment effect was caused by an actual change in the 
relative endowments, by a change in the relative weights, or by both. 
To analyse the change in the relative endowments and their coefficients over time, and to 
estimate how these changes can predict the over-time change in the wage gap, a modified 
version of the Oaxaca-Blinder analysis proposed by Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1991, 1993, 
JMP thereon) is adopted. The technique decomposes the over-time change in the wage gap 
to the change in its underlying endowment and coefficient effects (J1) which are further 
decomposed to their pure effects (first terms in equations J2 and J3) caused by the actual 
relative changes in their components over time, and to the change in their effect on the 
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wage gap as weights for their counterpart terms (second terms in J2 and J3). 
     CEwwww NSNS  1991199120092009                                                                          (J1) 
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         NSNNNNSSN XXXC 199119911991200919912009199120092009                     )3(J  
 
3.6 Limitations of the Oaxaca-type analyses 
As with any other parametric analysis, the questions remain: how realistic the initial 
assumptions were, how well-specified the model was, how omitted unobservable 
characteristics, discrimination or measurement errors bias the results, but most importantly, 
how well a model would describe wage determination if only supply-side factors are 
included? The association may not be truly linear (or quadratic where specified), or there 
might be a web of interactions between the different characteristics that predict wage levels, 
of which only a handful can be estimated without losing too many degrees of freedom. If 
such interactions are not explicitly modelled, it is impossible to predict whether – say – 
people with degree qualifications are rewarded more for higher-than-average labour market 
experience than those with A-levels. This may not cause serious bias itself on average, but 
it could be the source of a range of issues. Possible endogeneity – such as the long-
established association between family income and human capital (Gregg and Machin 
2000) – could also affect the predicting power of the model across the wage distribution in 
an unbalanced fashion, and may undermine the reliability of all results, not just at specific 
points. Similarly, if unobserved omitted variables correlate with both wages and wage 
determinants, the regression will yield biased estimates, even though some of the omitted 
variable bias stemming from individual heterogeneity will be corrected by performing an 
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over-time analysis on a panel dataset. Future research will have to try bridging the 
theoretical gap between the analyses of first and second moments of wage inequality, as 
even if one could measure all wage determinants and specify the ultimate model, 
coefficients estimated at the mean may not adequately explain associations across the 
whole distribution.  
 
3.7 North-South divide coefficient 
To address some of these limitations, and to suggest a possible test for the applicability of 
the estimates at different points of the wage distribution, analogously to Becker’s (1971) 
discrimination coefficient, a North-South divide coefficient (C1) will be constructed. 
   1exp  NdSdNdXC                                                                                                 )1(C                     
 
Following Becker’s specification, unlike in the Oaxaca equation, it will weight the 
coefficient gap by the Northern endowment vector to show the percentage that the average 
Northern wage would increase by in the absence of the North-South divide. By estimating 
C across all inter-decile ranges in selected years, the possible correlation between quantile 
rank and the magnitude of the North-South divide could be tested.  
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4. Data and Estimation 
 
For any over-time study, longitudinal surveys are the datasets of choice for being consistent 
in the measurement of key variables, and for helping to reduce the potential unobserved 
heterogeneity bias between the years by tracking the same individuals over time. The 
analysis draws from the available eighteen waves (1991 – 2009) of the nationally 
representative British Household Panel Survey (University of Essex 2010, BHPS thereon). 
The data includes information on 10,000 individuals’ human capital, earnings, occupation, 
industry and social indicators. Even though its individual response rate was 74% at the first 
wave, the stratified design ensured that it remained representative. The sample is 
unbalanced due to attrition, but respondents’ new family members are entered in the survey 
and are also considered in this analysis. The selected sample is restricted to 16 – 691 years 
old full-time employees (>30 hours a week) from England resulting in 3,500 observations 
per year, 60,000 in total. Models are estimated in Stata10.0 and Microsoft Excel registered 
to the University of Aberdeen. The top 0.1% of earners with incomes over £150,000 per 
annum was excluded, such as rows of observations with missing information in any of the 
variables2. Additional algorithms were run to detect and drop observations with major 
internal inconsistencies3. 
 
4.1 Variable and model specification 
Following the Mincerian (1974) tradition, the dependent variable is specified as the 
                                                  
1
 It has been decided to extend the age-range beyond the customary 65, as between 1991 and 2009 the 
proportion of respondents who kept working after reaching pension-age increased from 5% to 9%. Because 
the study is restricted to full time employees only, this extension is not likely to bias the results while the 
analysis can benefit from a larger sample size.  
2
 It has been chosen not to use imputation, although it is acknowledged that if the probability that certain 
variables will be missing correlates with some omitted factors, the exclusion may lead to bias. 
3
 Such as major inconsistency between monthly and annual income. All Stata do files are available on request. 
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logarithm of gross hourly wages, adjusted for overtime and inflated using the Consumer 
Prices Index (ONS 2010b) with 2008.4-2009.3 as the base period. This way, the coefficient 
estimates could be approximated as percentage returns to the relevant attributes. The wage 
variable is not available from the data, so it is derived according to equation (M1) by Booth 
et al. (2003), with Y as usual gross monthly earnings, h as weekly working hours excluding 
overtime, and OT as the usual number of paid weekly overtime multiplied by 333.1 .  
 OTh
Yy


12
52
                                                                                                            )1(M                     
 
Independent variables that are assumed to explain variation in wages are: job tenure and 
potential experience1 – current age minus age when respondent left education – in quadratic 
forms to allow for diminishing marginal returns (Oaxaca 1973); seventeen industry sectors2 
(Cameron 1985); twenty-six occupational class3 variables (Blinder 1971); as well as 
dummies indicating highest educational qualification (Blinder 1973), gender and marital 
status (Mincer 1974); employer size (Brown and Medoff 1989); work interruption during 
the previous year (Mincer and Ofek 1982); and whether the worker is covered by collective 
bargaining (Bloch and Kushin 1978).  
As described in section 3, the pooled-gender models are estimated separately in both 
regions for every year between 1991 and 2009. Women’s lower probability to self-select 
into the sample is corrected by estimating a participation equation modelling women’s 
decision as a function of variables that are assumed to affect reservation wage just like age 
in a quadratic form, husband’s labour income, non-labour household income4; as well as 
                                                  
1
 Experience variable is not available from the dataset, and cannot be inferred from the data, so it has to be 
approximated in the way described. 
2
 Constructed from Standard Industrial Classification (SIC92) 
3
 Constructed from the National Statistics Socio-economic Classification (NS-SEC)  
4
 Both variables are included in BHPS. 
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dummies indicating highest educational qualification, work interruption during the 
previous year, whether married, have small child(ren) under the age of five, and if receives 
Tax Credits or Housing Benefit.  
 
4.2 The sample 
While Table 1 only provides two snapshots of the sample – at both ends of the period –, 
some important features are immediately observable. The selected sample is very 
homogenous and mirrors national averages in most demographic characteristics (ONS 
2010c). Gender composition is remarkably similar, and there are no statistically significant 
differences in the means and variances of age, hours worked, potential experience, job 
tenure and employer size between the regions1 allowing the analysis to concentrate on 
factors that can be influenced by policy. While non-labour sources are of increasing 
importance, labour earnings in the sample are still by far the largest source of income with 
a substantial margin. Most importantly, 1991’s 18.8% gap between average regional wages 
expressed as a percentage of the Southern wage decreased to 13.4% by 2009, while the 
initial 27.3% gap in non-labour income dropped to 8.2% by the end of the period. There 
had been significant inter-regional differences in the years of education above compulsory 
level in 1991, but due to substantial improvements in Northern educational levels, the gap 
decreased markedly over the period. A similar pattern emerges with educational 
qualifications, occupational and industrial structure where the North was in a much less 
favourable position in 1991, but by 2009 a substantial part of these differences had been 
eliminated. Despite the extensive convergence in the occupational structure, by 2009 the 
relative proportion of Southern workers in higher and lower professional, managerial and 
                                                  
1
 Test statistics: 47.6AgeT , 95.3HoursT , 11.2ExperienceT , 56.5TenureT , 80.3EmployerT  
 Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (standard deviation in parenthesis) 
  North (1991)   South (1991)    North (2009) South (2009) 
Observations  1908    1836     1571    1469  
Real Hourly Wage (2008/2009 base year) 
 
£9.62 (4.73)   £11.85 (6.70)    £12.27     (6.60)   £14.17    (7.96) 
Potential Experience (Years) 
 
19.88 (12.55)   20.06 (12.73)     21.63   (12.24)   22.57     (12.86) 
Job Tenure (Years) 
 
6.04 (7.18)   5.36 (6.76)     5.69     (6.47)   5.84    (6.80) 
Age (Years)  37.13 (11.82)   37.80 (11.83)     39.41 (11.77)   40.65    (12.36) 
Years Education above Compulsory Level (Years) 
 
2.17 (2.57)   2.69 (2.76)     3.13     (2.77)   3.38    (2.73) 
Hours Worked  39.63 (5.90)   39.61 (6.71)     38.88    (5.68)   38.89     (5.79) 
Annual Real Labour Income  £18,778 (12244) £21,934 (14975)    £22,696   (14377)  £26,479   (17854) 
Annual Real Non-Labour Income  £801 (1,703)   £1,103 (2,456)     £1,581     (5,018)   £1,722     (4,692) 
House Prices (Nationwide BS Figures) 
 
£84,893 (5,030) £99,882   (10,813)  £131,375 (7,289) £190,425  (33,401) 
Male  63.26%  64.76%   60.53%  60.99%  
Married or Widowed  72.63%  69.87%   74.18%  70.98%  
Covered by Collective Bargaining  51.89%  42.32%   46.65%  37.82%  
Recent Work Interruption  4.94%  5.10%   2.02%  1.75%  
Missing Information (Including on Wage)  12.21%  16.78%   11.78%  15.72%  
Highest Educational Qualification           
 Postgraduate Qualification  1.15%  2.51%   4.30%  4.69%  
 First Degree  10.65%  12.48%   19.91%  21.31%  
 A-levels or HNC/HND  29.91%  33.73%   52.78%  51.28%  
 O-levels or GCSE  23.56%  24.09%   13.29%  14.28%  
 None of the Above (including apprenticeships)  34.73%  27.19%   9.72%  8.45%  
Employer size           
 1-24 workers  28.81%  30.06%   27.32%  31.07%  
 25-499 workers  52.14%  50.69%   52.17%  48.25%  
 >500 workers  19.05%  19.25%   20.52%  20.69%  
Occupational Class (NS SEC)           
 Higher Managerial  4.10%  5.92%   6.87%  7.54%  
 Higher Professional occupations (traditional)  4.99%  5.40%   5.32%  5.25%  
 Higher Professional occupations (new)  1.19%  2.93%   2.29%  4.29%  
 Lower Professional occupations (traditional)  13.14%  15.56%   18.25%  18.26%  
 Lower Professional occupations (new)  0.83%  0.91%   1.35%  1.63%  
 Lower Managerial occupations  6.42%  10.29%   11.31%  14.34%  
 Higher Supervisory occupations  4.34%  5.92%   2.96%  2.96%  
 Intermediate Clerical and Administration  10.11%  11.98%   7.95%  7.10%  
 Intermediate Sales and Service  3.63%  3.84%   5.32%  5.84%  
 Intermediate Technical and Auxiliary  1.31%  0.98%   1.41%  1.70%  
 Intermediate Engineering  0.77%  0.78%   0.47%  0.74%  
 Lower Supervisory occupations  10.46%  8.01%   6.26%  5.03%  
 Lower Technical Craft  5.95%  4.69%   4.85%  3.62%  
 Lower Technical Process Operative  1.49%  0.91%   0.67%  0.81%  
 Semi-routine Sales  2.02%  2.08%   2.56%  2.73%  
 Semi-routine Service  3.57%  3.78%   5.12%  4.51%  
 Semi-routine Technical  3.45%  1.69%   2.15%  1.18%  
 Semi-routine Operative  3.51%  2.02%   1.41%  1.77%  
 Semi-routine Agricultural  0.42%  0.78%   0.13%  0.22%  
 Semi-routine Clerical  1.07%  1.17%   1.55%  1.11%  
 Semi-routine Childcare  0.18%  0.20%   0.81%  0.89%  
 Routine Sales and Service  1.01%  1.37%   0.88%  0.74%  
 Routine Production  2.56%  1.50%   0.67%  0.89%  
 Routine Technical  9.04%  4.62%   5.45%  4.21%  
 Routine Operative  4.28%  2.47%   3.84%  2.37%  
 Routine Agricultural  0.18%  0.20%   0.13%  0.30%  
Industrial Sector (SIC92)           
 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery and Mining  2.48%  2.96%   1.49%  2.00%  
 Food, Beverages and Tobacco  3.22%  1.70%   0.19%  0.52%  
 Manufacture of Textile, Wood, Paper, Furniture  9.55%  7.28%   3.04%  1.36%  
 Manufacturing of Chemicals, Oil and Metal  7.23%  2.68%   7.87%  5.68%  
 Manufacturing of Machinery   12.35%  10.24%   5.70%  5.17%  
 Supply of Utilities, Waste and Recycling  2.27%  2.03%   1.49%  1.42%  
 Construction  7.02%  6.84%   8.49%  7.56%  
 Sales  11.03%  11.88%   11.90%  12.21%  
 Hospitality, Entertainment and Personal Services  8.18%  9.09%   7.13%  8.98%  
 Transport  5.75%  6.46%   5.95%  6.01%  
 Financial services  8.13%  14.67%   4.03%  5.94%  
 Real Estate and Renting  0.90%  0.77%   1.67%  2.33%  
 IT  0.42%  0.71%   1.98%  2.71%  
 Professional and Business Services  0.32%  0.77%   9.11%  12.73%  
 Public Administration  6.60%  8.48%   8.98%  7.95%  
 Education  6.65%  5.80%   8.61%  8.59%  
 Health and Social Work  7.92%  7.66%   12.39%  8.85%  
intermediate occupations is still higher, while Northern workers are still more likely to be 
employed in less-paid lower technical, semi-routine and routine occupations. In 1991 
50.8% of Northern and 64.5% of Southern workers were employed in occupations which 
required A-level or higher qualifications; by 2009 the proportions changed to 63.5% and 
69.7% respectively. With regards to industry structure, while improvements have been 
significant, marked differences still exist in finance-, professional and business services 
sectors, while Northern workers are still more likely to work in sectors with relatively 
lower industry-premium. While the North grew faster in most “good” characteristics, the 
South too improved its average endowment and was still leading in many categories by 
2009. 
 
4.3 The wage gap 
It has been chosen not to adjust wages to regional differences in the cost of living as such 
indices have only been produced by the Office for National Statistics for two years (2000 
and 2004) during the period as a by-product of Europe-wide surveys (Wingfield et al 2005). 
Using the much more comprehensive Nationwide regional house-price index has also been 
ruled out, as wages are not meant to compensate for changes in house prices. Table 2’s first 
column shows the CPI-inflated regional wage-series used in this study, and as an indication 
its second and third column demonstrates how different the series would have been if the 
multipliers were applied1. The common feature of all three measures is that they all confirm 
the existence of an unadjusted pay gap, which seems to be declining over time.  
Figures 2 and 3 graph wages from Table 2’s first column and their convergence through the 
period during which over a quarter of the original wage gap disappeared. Initially the 
                                                  
1
 The second column shows regional wages between 1991 and 2002 adjusted by the regional price index from 
2000, while wages from 2003 onwards are multiplied by the 2004 set of weights.  
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representative Northern worker gets paid 9% below the national average, while its Southern 
counterpart receives 10% above the mean, but by 2009 the gap shrinks to 6.5% below and 
7% above the average, respectively.  
 
Table 2. Inflating wages with local price index and house price inflation 
Inflated by: CPI  CPI + Regional price index  CPI + House price index 
  North South   North South   North South  
1991  £9.62 £11.85 18.80%  £9.87 £11.46 13.84%  £9.62 £11.85 18.80% 
1992  £10.06 £12.11 16.89%  £10.32 £11.71 11.81%  £10.96 £13.49 18.74% 
1993  £10.23 £12.17 15.97%  £10.49 £11.77 10.84%  £10.48 £12.14 13.69% 
1994  £10.24 £12.16 15.81%  £10.50 £11.76 10.67%  £10.70 £12.10 11.53% 
1995  £10.44 £12.24 14.77%  £10.71 £11.84 9.57%  £10.70 £12.21 12.36% 
1996  £10.46 £12.17 14.10%  £10.73 £11.77 8.86%  £10.00 £11.16 10.45% 
1997  £10.26 £11.92 13.95%  £10.53 £11.53 8.70%  £9.95 £11.00 9.53% 
1998  £10.29 £12.09 14.88%  £10.56 £11.69 9.69%  £10.18 £11.42 10.85% 
1999  £10.71 £12.28 12.82%  £10.99 £11.88 7.50%  £10.05 £10.44 3.78% 
2000  £10.90 £12.51 12.85%  £11.18 £12.09 7.53%  £10.28 £11.58 11.29% 
2001  £11.19 £12.73 12.09%  £11.48 £12.31 6.73%  £9.75 £11.00 11.43% 
2002  £11.80 £13.77 14.32%  £12.11 £13.32 9.09%  £9.42 £11.45 17.73% 
2003  £11.88 £13.66 13.05%  £12.35 £13.01 5.01%  £9.90 £12.63 21.62% 
2004  £12.02 £13.85 13.24%  £12.50 £13.19 5.22%  £11.21 £13.57 17.34% 
2005  £12.20 £14.00 12.86%  £12.69 £13.33 4.81%  £12.20 £14.01 12.89% 
2006  £12.31 £14.11 12.77%  £12.80 £13.44 4.70%  £11.97 £13.11 8.73% 
2007  £12.38 £13.96 11.34%  £12.87 £13.29 3.14%  £13.28 £14.76 9.98% 
2008  £12.27 £14.17 13.45%  £12.76 £13.49 5.45%  £14.48 £16.76 13.64% 
 
Figure 2. Regional gross average real hourly wages of 
full time employees with reference to the national 
average (Inflated by CPI, base year: 2008/2009) 
Figure 3. Regional gross mean hourly labour wages of 
full time employees as a percentage of the national 
average 
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Figures 4 and 5 – by keeping the exact scale of Figure 2 – show that while within region 
inequalities grew, the between region gaps at selected percentiles have decreased.  
 
Figure 4. Southern gross real average hourly labour 
wages of full time employees at different points in the 
wage distribution. (base year: 2008/2009) 
Figure 5. Northern gross real average hourly labour 
wages of full time employees at different points in the 
wage distribution. (base year: 2008/2009) 
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4.4 Insights from the year-by-year OLS results 
All coefficients in the year-by-year per-region OLS estimates1 have the expected sign and 
magnitude. All groups of categorical variables – educational qualifications, employer sizes, 
occupations and sectors – confirm the expected relation between the group-variables. The 
specification explains 56% of the variance on average after adjusting for the lost degrees of 
freedom, with no over-time trend in R2. A very high proportion of coefficients – including 
the twenty-six occupational and seventeen sectoral dummies – are significant at the 1% 
level throughout the period. T-tests on the Inverse Mills’ Ratio indicates selection bias in 
most annual regressions of both regions up to 2002, from which point – may be explained 
by the increasing female participation levels – it never turns significant again. Although the 
test statistic decreased over the period, all hypotheses that the coefficient vectors between 
North and South are not significantly different could be rejected in all years at 0001.0p . 
While all other coefficients show a definitive trend of convergence, the starkest cross-
regional differences, both in absolute terms and in their trend, are found between returns to 
potential experience, occupations and industry structure, which makes them potential 
candidates to account for the unexplainable part of the observed pay gap. Northern 
coefficients on occupational classes increase markedly throughout the period and by 2009 
wage premia are higher in almost every occupation in the North. On the other hand, from 
2002 onwards Southern returns to experience rise gradually soon becoming over a half 
larger than the corresponding Northern coefficients. Regions seem to offer slightly higher 
wages in their traditionally regional industries – e.g. manufacture in the North, finance in 
the South, but on average Southern industries appear to pay a higher industry wage 
premium than their Northern counterparts.  
                                                  
1
 Table A.1 shows four selected years’ regression output: 1991, 1996, 2002 and 2008. The results for these 
years do not differ in any systematic way from the non-reported years. All results are available on request. 
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Figures 6 and 7 show how coefficients on tertiary and secondary qualifications decline 
considerably in both regions, but remain somewhat higher in the North during the period 
(O-level / GCSE qualifications are not graphed, as they only exert significant effects on 
wages through the 1990s). Returns to large employer is higher in the South, while union 
coverage premium, although declining in both regions, found to be considerably higher in 
the North. Coefficients on gender gap were initially higher in the North, but fell below 
Southern levels by 2005. 
 
 
    Figure 6. Over-time change in Northern coefficients of selected categorical variables. 
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    Figure 7. Over-time change in Southern coefficients of selected categorical variables. 
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Figures 8 and 9 – by multiplying the coefficient vector with the vector of average 
characteristics and expressing it as a percentage of the predicted wage – show the relative 
importance of each groups of variables in predicting the average worker‘s wage year-by-
year. The percentages on the graph are therefore not marginal returns. The advantage of  
 
Figure 8. Percentage of Northern average wage predicted by categories of regressors 
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 Figure 9. Percentage of Southern average wage predicted by categories of regressors 
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such a representation over presenting the change in the coefficients over time is that this 
approach also takes the changes in the characteristic-means into account. For the average 
worker (see Table 1) experience is found to be very important in predicting wages, 
especially in the South. Occupation and industry sector determine around 20% of the mean 
wage, yet the much higher Northern coefficients on occupational classes do not seem to 
translate into a stronger effect of occupations in the Northern wage determination implying 
a lower supply in the high premium occupations and/or a lager supply in the low premium 
occupations in the North compared to Southern levels. While hardly 6% of the wage can be 
attributed to education, the relatively stable share of education confirms that the falling 
coefficients and the increasing participation cancelled each other out in their effect on the 
wage. Job tenure, gender, marriage, employer size and union premium all decline in 
importance, but remain somewhat stronger in the North, predicting 10% of the wage by 
2009 compared to 7% in the South.  
 
4.5 Oaxaca decomposition results 
The gross North-South log wage gap – expressed as a percentage of the Southern log wage 
– reached over 16.9% in 1991 but gradually declined to 13% by 2009. As shown in Figure 
10 Northerners' less favourable mean characteristics only explained a third of the gap 
initially, but as the North improved its relative position in most measurable differences, the 
endowment gap decreased so much that by 2003 North-South differences in the average 
worker’s human capital became statistically insignificant confirming that much of the pay 
gap was not the outcome of Northern workers’ different characteristics. On the other hand, 
the coefficient effect, the effect due to unexplainable inter-regional differential treatment of 
otherwise identical workers – the adjusted North-South divide –, remained relatively stable 
in absolute terms and was responsible for most of the raw pay gap throughout the period. 
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 Figure 10. The relative contribution of the main terms 
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The endowment effect, as in Table 31, was initially caused by the fewer workers in high 
wage-premium occupations and the lower average educational attainment in the North. The 
results also confirm that much of the educational attainment gap – responsible for over one 
fifth of 1991’s pay differences – had been eliminated by the end of the 1990s, while the 
occupational gap – although halved in absolute terms – remained relatively stable in its 
contribution and in most years accounts for a quarter of the entire pay gap. Industrial 
structure as a whole is only responsible for a small fraction of pay differentials as a result of 
                                                  
1
 The decomposition technique used makes it possible to discuss the endowment or coefficient effect of any 
one characteristic in isolation, as the reported values indicate their individual effects on the overall pay gap. 
This – on the other hand – makes the interpretation of the results less straightforward. The endowment and 
coefficient gaps are weighted by Southern coefficient and mean endowment vectors respectively, and 
although the resulting gap-component expresses the variable’s individual effect on the overall gap, – by being 
a product – it does not tell the underlying relations, such as whether there are more or less people in the North 
having the particular characteristic or whether Northern or Southern coefficients are higher. As an example, 
positive values on both postgraduate qualification’s and no qualification’s endowment effect – assuming that 
the coefficient is positive for the former and negative for the latter – simply mean that there are less workers 
with postgraduate, while more workers with no qualifications in the North than in the South. Note, that the 
sign of coefficients cannot simply be guessed as coefficients of categorical variables are normalised, so they 
express differences from their common means. In Table 3 percentages show the individual components’ effect 
on the entire log pay gap. Negative percentages show how much of the overall pay gap is reduced by the 
relevant factor. Percentages sum to slightly more than 100% as the interaction term (not reported), is yet to be 
deducted from either of the terms according to the non-discriminatory norm.  
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a fine balance between industries with increasing and decreasing individual effects on the 
gap. The North’s wider union coverage and its initially higher average job tenure only 
reduce wage differences significantly during the 1990s. Gender, potential experience, 
marriage and employer size would not exert significant endowment effects on wage gap as 
these are equally distributed across the regions.  
The detailed decomposition results in Tables A.2/1 and A.2/3 show that the occupational 
gap is mainly caused by the North’s too few workers in managerial and professional 
positions, and too many workers in routine technical and operative occupations compared 
to Southern proportions. It can also be seen that the majority of the initial educational gap 
was not caused by differences in workers with secondary or tertiary certificates, as such 
differences were nearly insignificant, but by the gradually higher number of workers with 
no qualifications in the North. The convergence in average educational levels was mainly 
facilitated by closing this particular gap, and also by slight improvements in the relative 
proportion of workers with university education. The industry-mix gap has been primarily 
caused by the North’s too few workers in the high wage-premium financial and IT, and too 
many workers in the lower premium health sector; however these effects are somewhat 
counterbalanced by the higher proportion of Northern workers in manufacturing and 
construction, and fewer workers in hospitality and sales sectors than in the South. 
The coefficient effect is largely determined by the intercept-gap, which is in most years 
responsible for over 100% of the entire pay gap. Since categorical variable coefficients 
have been normalised, the intercept-gap does not include the effect of any one excluded 
categorical variables, and therefore such a gap suggests that a substantial part of the North-
South divide is caused by factors not included in the model. While experience levels are 
very similar across the regions, from 1998 Southern coefficients on experience begin a 
gradual rise and by 2004 differences in the returns to experience become as important as 
 Table 3/1. Oaxaca decomposition results 
 1991   1992   1993   1994   1995   1996   1997   1998   1999  
Log of Wage Gap 0.169   0.167   0.154   0.149   0.146   0.150   0.135   0.139   0.141  
Endowment effect 0.071 43%  0.047 29%  0.037 23%  0.027 20%  0.035 26%  0.033 21%  0.024 18%  0.039 28%  0.018 13% 
Experience -0.002 -1%  -0.004 -2%  -0.004 -3%  -0.003 -2%  -0.001 0%  -0.005 -3%  -0.005 -3%  -0.006 -4%  -0.009 -6% 
Job tenure -0.002 -1%  -0.002 -1%  -0.003 -2%  -0.003 -2%  -0.006 -4%  -0.005 -3%  -0.003 -2%  -0.005 -3%  -0.008 -6% 
Educational Attainment 0.021 13%  0.020 12%  0.015 9%  0.014 11%  0.015 11%  0.016 10%  0.009 7%  0.012 9%  0.007 5% 
Gender Gap 0.000 0%  -0.003 -2%  -0.002 -1%  -0.004 -3%  -0.006 -5%  -0.002 -1%  -0.002 -2%  -0.002 -2%  -0.001 -1% 
Collective Bargaining -0.006 -3%  -0.007 -4%  -0.008 -5%  -0.005 -4%  -0.011 -8%  -0.008 -5%  -0.003 -3%  -0.003 -2%  -0.001 -1% 
Occupation 0.051 31%  0.041 25%  0.039 25%  0.023 17%  0.034 25%  0.033 21%  0.034 26%  0.044 32%  0.028 20% 
Industry 0.013 8%  0.009 5%  0.002 1%  0.007 5%  0.010 7%  0.006 4%  0.002 1%  0.001 1%  0.005 4% 
                           
Coefficient effect 0.123 74%  0.136 82%  0.14 88%  0.12 88%  0.109 80%  0.124 79%  0.123 91%  0.109 79%  0.131 93% 
Experience 0.021 12%  -0.060 -37%  -0.130 -82%  0.017 12%  -0.053 -39%  -0.039 -25%  -0.006 -4%  0.034 24%  0.002 1% 
Job tenure 0.004 3%  0.003 2%  0.012 8%  -0.005 -3%  0.019 14%  0.007 4%  0.004 3%  0.007 5%  0.020 14% 
Educational Attainment 0.007 4%  -0.016 -10%  0.000 0%  0.002 2%  -0.006 -5%  -0.039 -25%  -0.012 -9%  -0.004 -3%  0.006 5% 
Gender Gap -0.019 -12%  -0.037 -23%  -0.025 -16%  -0.013 -10%  0.005 4%  -0.050 -32%  0.015 11%  0.003 2%  -0.025 -17% 
Collective Bargaining -0.027 -16%  -0.021 -13%  -0.019 -12%  -0.031 -23%  -0.016 -12%  -0.016 -10%  -0.039 -29%  -0.013 -9%  -0.016 -11% 
Occupation 0.021 13%  0.012 7%  0.049 31%  0.030 22%  0.019 14%  0.012 7%  0.033 25%  0.047 34%  0.019 13% 
Industry 0.013 8%  0.032 19%  0.013 8%  0.006 4%  0.042 31%  0.028 18%  0.026 19%  -0.015 -11%  0.002 1% 
Intercept 0.115 69%  0.210 127%  0.259 163%  0.122 90%  0.080 58%  0.209 133%  0.113 84%  0.082 59%  0.198 140% 
 
Table 3/2. 
 2000     2001     2002     2003     2004     2005     2006     2007     2008  
Log of Wage Gap 0.127   0.116   0.146   0.126   0.107   0.126   0.107   0.099   0.117  
Endowment effect 0.033 26%  0.013 12%  0.026 18%  0.015 12%  0.004 4%  0.008 6%  0.002 2%  0.014 14%  0.033 28% 
Experience -0.011 -8%  -0.017 -15%  -0.016 -11%  -0.018 -14%  -0.015 -14%  -0.011 -9%  -0.011 -11%  -0.011 -11%  -0.003 -2% 
Job tenure -0.002 -1%  -0.001 -1%  0.000 0%  -0.003 -3%  -0.001 -1%  -0.001 -1%  0.000 0%  0.000 0%  0.000 0% 
Educational Attainment 0.010 8%  0.005 5%  0.008 5%  0.009 7%  0.005 5%  0.004 4%  0.002 2%  0.010 10%  0.002 2% 
Gender Gap -0.001 -1%  -0.001 -1%  0.003 2%  0.000 0%  -0.002 -2%  -0.001 0%  -0.002 -2%  -0.005 -5%  0.001 1% 
Collective Bargaining -0.003 -2%  -0.003 -2%  0.000 0%  0.000 0%  0.000 0%  -0.001 -1%  0.002 2%  -0.002 -2%  0.000 0% 
Occupation 0.040 31%  0.023 20%  0.033 23%  0.028 22%  0.023 22%  0.016 12%  0.012 11%  0.022 22%  0.025 22% 
Industry 0.000 0%  0.008 7%  -0.001 -1%  0.002 2%  -0.005 -5%  0.004 3%  0.004 4%  0.005 5%  0.008 7% 
                           
Coefficient effect 0.106 83%  0.113 97%  0.137 94%  0.123 97%  0.107 100%  0.12 96%  0.126 117%  0.091 91%  0.105 89% 
Experience 0.025 20%  -0.010 -9%  0.056 38%  0.060 47%  0.078 73%  0.067 53%  0.118 110%  0.122 124%  0.109 93% 
Job tenure -0.008 -6%  -0.010 -8%  -0.014 -10%  0.004 4%  0.003 3%  -0.003 -2%  -0.013 -13%  -0.011 -11%  -0.009 -8% 
Educational Attainment 0.004 3%  0.030 26%  0.024 17%  -0.007 -6%  -0.015 -14%  -0.021 -17%  -0.022 -20%  -0.032 -32%  -0.027 -23% 
Gender Gap 0.000 0%  -0.024 -21%  -0.003 -2%  -0.036 -29%  0.019 18%  -0.012 -9%  -0.004 -4%  0.010 10%  0.011 9% 
Collective Bargaining -0.018 -14%  -0.021 -18%  -0.046 -31%  -0.038 -30%  -0.027 -26%  -0.030 -24%  -0.034 -32%  -0.010 -10%  -0.037 -32% 
Occupation 0.012 9%  -0.003 -2%  0.002 1%  0.024 19%  -0.027 -25%  0.033 26%  -0.010 -10%  -0.022 -22%  -0.047 -40% 
Industry 0.017 13%  -0.022 -19%  -0.039 -26%  -0.010 -8%  -0.010 -9%  0.004 3%  0.025 23%  0.020 20%  0.028 24% 
Intercept 0.143 112%  0.191 164%  0.197 134%  0.148 117%  0.073 68%  0.082 65%  0.099 93%  0.042 42%  0.101 86% 
the intercept in explaining the regional pay gap. The coefficient effect due to the South’s 
higher industry premium magnifies pay differences further. Only a third of these effects is 
counterbalanced by the higher Northern coefficients on union premium, marriage and the 
gender gap in most years, as well as coefficients on education and occupational classes 
towards the end of the period.  
The detailed decomposition (Tables A.2/2 and A.2/4) shows that the coefficient effect on 
education, which works towards reducing the wage gap, develops when Southern returns to 
O-level and A-level/HNC/HND qualifications drop substantially around 2002 while it 
remains relatively stable in the North throughout. The results also confirm that the 
coefficient effect on industry structure is mainly caused by the higher Southern industry 
wage-premium in the financial, public administration, transportation and professional 
services sectors, however the relatively higher Northern premium in manufacturing, 
education, health and sales sectors somewhat weaken the overall effect. It can be seen that 
in the 1990s the coefficient effect on occupations further aggravates pay differences, but the 
tendency is gradually reversing from 2002 onwards, when returns to top occupational 
classes become markedly higher in the North.  
To summarise, the year-by-year Oaxaca analysis confirms that the North has successfully 
closed the gap in educational attainment levels, and also significantly improved its 
industrial and occupational structure, which has long been argued to be the primary cause 
of the North-South divide. The magnitude of the effect caused by less favourable industry 
and occupation mix halved from its 1991 level and by 2004 it was only liable for a quarter 
of the gap between average regional log wages – practically the only remaining wage gap 
that can be attributed to measurable characteristic-differences. The data also confirms that 
the unexplainable coefficient gap remained relatively stable over the period and is 
responsible for over four fifths of the difference in regional averages in most years. If by 
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adopting the view that industrial and occupational structure is a possible source of the 
divide, and accordingly only human capital is accounted for in the analysis, it can be 
concluded that by the end of the period, the entire pay gap becomes attributable to an 
unexplainable coefficient effect – or the North-South divide. The analysis, while confirming 
the existence of the divide, remains largely inconclusive in identifying the sources of such 
effect, as most of the coefficient differences are caused by the intercept-gap and the very 
different returns to experience from 1998 onwards. As average experience levels are 
identical across the regions, this suggests that a large part of the pay gap might be 
determined by variables not included in the model. 
 
4.6 North-South divide coefficient 
While the paper could stop here, the analysis would be of little use if along the wage 
distribution the proportion of the forces identified, especially the unexplainable coefficient 
effects, would be very different. To test how representative previous findings may be along 
the distribution, a North-South divide coefficient, indicating how much Northern wages 
would increase in the absence of the North-South divide, is calculated at every inter-decile 
range in selected years to analyse how different the North-South divide might be upon 
departure from the means.  
 
Table 4. The North-South divide coefficient 
Inter-decile range  1991 2000 2009 
9th - 10th  30.27% 12.00% 13.04% 
8th - 9th  29.65% 15.77% 16.53% 
7th - 8th        20.99% 14.55% 16.60% 
6th - 7th  21.82% 15.08% 15.08% 
5th - 6th  21.32% 16.34% 14.37% 
4th - 5th  19.32% 14.16% 13.62% 
3rd - 4th  16.55% 13.69% 10.80% 
2nd - 3rd  13.87% 11.04% 10.15% 
1st - 2nd  13.48%   7.81%   8.98% 
0 - 1st    5.38%   3.89%   7.77% 
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Table 4 shows a strong negative correlation between inter-quantile rank and the size of the 
unfavourable treatment effect – or the North-South divide; and also confirms a reduction in  
the unexplainable part of the gap over time in most decile ranges. The relatively even 
distribution of the coefficient, and the findings suggesting that lower wage groups may 
experience less of the divide, give some comfort over the applicability of earlier findings 
across the wage distribution.   
 
4.7 JMP decomposition results 
The dynamic decomposition, by concentrating on the change in the underlying components 
of the pay gap, could give some additional insight into what might have happened between 
1991 and 2009, during which period the logarithm of the pay gap, expressed as a 
percentage of the average Southern log wage, has decreased from 16.9% to 13%. While the 
wage gap was highest in 1991, its lowest level was not in 2009, but a year earlier. However 
to offset cyclical effects, 2009 is chosen as both 1991 and 2009 are at approximately similar 
stages in the trade cycle and both 2008’s and 2009’s wage gap are equally far from their 
three-year moving average making them trough and peak of a generally downward cycle.  
The dynamic decomposition analysis confirms much of the earlier findings, but the results 
also suggest that the Oaxaca analysis did not tell the whole story. The JMP analysis reveals 
that the previously identified effect by the improved Northern endowments could only 
accomplish decreasing the wage gap, because the much stronger individual components of 
the coefficient effect happened to cancel one other out. While the marked improvements in 
Northern educational attainment and occupational structure could paradoxically explain the 
entire 3.9% decrease in the log wage gap, the results also show that it would not have 
resulted in such a favourable scenario had relative Northern occupational wage premia for 
top occupations not increased considerably over the period, as such rising Northern 
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occupational wage-inequality was essential to contain the unexplainable coefficient effect 
driven by the increase in Southern returns to experience which was so strong, it alone could 
have offset all effects of the Northern convergence. As components of the coefficient effect 
operating in either direction are estimated to be four times as strong as the endowment 
effect, even though their overall effect sums to zero, it has to be acknowledged that the 
over-time decrease in the wage gap was more of the outcome of a fortunate balance 
between coefficient effect components, than of improvements in the Northern endowment. 
The pure endowment effect, or the relative improvements in the North’s measurable 
characteristics, account for 100% of the decrease in the pay gap over the period. The results 
(Table 51) confirm earlier findings as these improvements were primarily driven by larger 
Northern improvements in occupational mix and educational attainment. A slight Northern 
improvement in the relative industry structure is also traceable.  
The detailed decomposition (Table A.3) reveals that the endowment effect on education 
was due to higher over-time increases in Northern levels of postgraduate, first degree and 
A-level/HNC/HND qualifications and to the decrease in the proportion of workers with no 
qualifications. The decrease in the pay gap caused by changes in the relative occupational 
mix are accountable to larger over-time boosts in the proportion of people working as (in 
order of importance) lower and higher managers, lower and higher professionals, 
intermediate administrators and higher supervisors in the North. These developments 
happened in the traditional professional occupations – such as doctor, solicitor, engineer – 
as the North’s relative position in modern professional job categories – such as software 
designer – has worsened over time.   
                                                  
1
 Following earlier notation percentages show the change in the overall pay gap attributable to the relevant 
characteristic. Negative percentages imply forces that decreased the pay gap. 
  
 
 
Table 5. JMP decomposition results 
North-South Log Wage Gap in 1991 0.169             
North-South Log Wage Gap in 2009 0.130             
Effects 
 Pure Endowment   SNS XX 2009   Endowment Weights   SNS XX  19911991  Pure Coefficient  NSNX  2009  Coefficient Weights  NSNX 19911991    
Sample Selectivity Adjusted Log Gap -0.039  -0.039 -100%  0.001 2%  0.007 18%  -0.008 -20% 
 
 
            
Experience   0.000 0%  0.000 0%  0.091 236%  0.000 0% 
Job Tenure   0.004 9%  -0.001 -3%  -0.014 -35%  0.000 -1% 
Educational Attainment   -0.012 -32%  -0.007 -17%  -0.034 -89%  0.000 -1% 
Job Interruption Penalty   0.000 -1%  0.000 -1%  0.000 -1%  0.001 3% 
Male Premium   0.001 2%  0.000 0%  0.029 74%  0.001 4% 
Marriage Premium   0.001 3%  0.001 2%  -0.003 -7%  0.000 -1% 
Employer Size   0.001 3%  0.001 3%  -0.014 -36%  0.001 3% 
Collective Bargaining    0.000 0%  0.006 16%  -0.016 -42%  0.003 9% 
Occupation   -0.030 -77%  0.004 11%  -0.061 -158%  0.006 17% 
Industry   -0.002 -5%  -0.003 -8%  0.033 87%  -0.020 -51% 
Intercept   0.000 0%  0.000 0%  -0.014 -37%  0.000 0% 
The pure coefficient effect, or the over-time change in the relative returns to wage 
determinants, although only responsible for slightly increasing the pay gap, reveal some 
extremely strong counteracting forces. The results indicate that the coefficient gap between 
Northern and Southern returns to experience increased so much over the period that, in the 
absence of counterbalancing forces, it alone could have caused the overall pay gap to 
increase by as much as it decreased since 1991. The effect was further strengthened by a 
relative decrease in the Northern gender gap, which fell below Southern levels during the 
period and by increases in the Southern industry-premia. The detailed decomposition 
(Table A.3) reveals that this was primarily driven by the relative increases in the Southern 
wage premia in professional services, transport, health and public administration sectors, 
although these effects were somewhat contained by relative increases in the Northern 
premia in IT, sales, primary industries and most manufacturing sectors. These effects 
together, had not been neutralised almost perfectly, could have doubled 1991’s initial 
16.9% log wage gap. The most important offsetting forces were the coefficient effect of 
occupational structure led by substantial relative and absolute growths in the Northern wage 
premia for managerial and professional occupational classes, where a substantial increase in 
Northern wage premia coincided with a slight fall in the corresponding Southern premia 
and the coefficient effect of educational qualifications mainly caused by the substantially 
declining returns to A-level/HNC/NHD qualifications in the South, whereas Northern 
returns remained relatively stable. Bigger Northern increases in the returns to job tenure, 
slower Northern declines in the union premium, a fall in the Southern employer-size 
premium driven by a marked fall in the wage premium offered by small and medium sized 
employers in the South, as well as a reduction in the unexplainable intercept-gap 
strengthened the opponent forces further. Those together have almost fully neutralised the 
coefficient effects of returns to experience, occupation and gender gap, working in the 
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opposite direction, and therefore the Northern endowment-convergence could apply its full 
force in decreasing the pay gap. 
Both weight effects are the secondary products of the previously discussed pure effects by 
acting as weights for their counterparts, therefore discussing them would not add to this 
analysis especially that their magnitude is very low indeed.  
The results, while confirming earlier findings, make them less robust at the same time. The 
pay gap did decline as an outcome of the North’s remarkable improvements in all 
measurable areas, but parallel coefficient effects in both directions, four times as strong as 
pure endowment effects, have also been detected. As the two regions are very homogenous 
in their potential experience levels, the extremely strong coefficient effect on the variable 
implies that the wage gap could be largely influenced by over-time changes in unobserved 
characteristics with which experience levels correlate, suggesting some kind of inter-
regional disequilibria, external economies or spill-over effects in the South as an outcome 
of the 1990s’ unequal human capital distribution.  
The conclusion that the coefficient effects of occupations and educational attainment 
counterbalanced the coefficient effect of returns to experience, and therefore improvements 
in the Northern endowments could decrease the pay gap, is not the only possible 
interpretation of the findings. An equally valid argument would be that the increase in the 
North-South divide was much greater than the improvements in the relative Northern 
endowments during the period, however the wage gap still dropped, because the within 
region inequality, created by the rising Northern wage premia in top occupations, simply 
pulled the average Northern wage up with the seemingly beneficial side-effect of shrinking 
the inter-regional wage gap. It could be argued that increasing returns to top occupations 
are signs of a more buoyant economy in the North, however the counter argument would 
always point to the unsustainability of prolonged periods of cross-regional wage premia 
 44
dispersion, implying that the findings may rather suggest some kind of temporary 
disequilibrium.  
To summarise, just as the Oaxaca approach, the JMP analysis confirmed that unexplainable 
coefficient differences exerted a substantially higher effect on the over-time change in the 
North-South wage gap than effects by measurable characteristics. The very different returns 
imply that policy-induced improvements in Northern characteristics will not necessarily 
decrease the pay gap as much as suggested by the coefficient estimates.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
The existence of the North-South divide has been confirmed by showing in both static and 
dynamic analyses that measurable differences in worker and labour market characteristics 
can only explain a quarter of the pay gap or its change over time. It has been suggested that 
factors not included in the model could be responsible for as much as half of the 
unexplained part of the gap. The paper has shown that Southern returns to experience 
increased so much over the period, that the North’s remarkable catch-up in educational 
attainment, occupational and industrial structure could only translate into an actual decrease 
in the overall pay gap, because it coincided with a marked rise among Northern 
occupational wage premia for top occupations, which increased Northern wages just 
enough so that wage increases in the South stemming from the higher returns to experience 
were matched. The quarter decrease in the pay gap over the 1991-2009 period therefore 
was more of the outcome of an increasing within-region wage inequality, than of the inter-
regional convergence in endowment levels, suggesting that the size of the wage gap and its 
change may be much more dependent on effects that are not directly controllable by policy. 
Although the increase in the Northern occupational premia for top occupations increased 
the average Northern wage, did it in an unaccountable fashion, and consequently the 
observed convergence in the wage levels did not come from sustainable sources. This way, 
paradoxically, the analysis confirmed a causal relationship between increasing intra-
regional earnings inequality and falling inter-regional inequality in the average wage. It is 
expected that the higher Northern occupational wage premia will slow down any further 
wage-convergence between North and South, as such differences are not sustainable in the 
long run. The evidence implies that supply-side policies may succeed in eradicating a 
fraction of the remaining wage gap, but only at a price of an increased Northern inequality. 
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Appendices  
Table A.1 OLS results 
 1991 1996 2002 2008 
 North  South  North  South  North  South  North  South  
Experience 0.030*** (0.000) 0.034*** (0.000)  0.036*** (0.000)  0.032*** (0.000)  0.027*** (0.000)  0.035*** (0.000) 0.021*** (0.000) 0.034*** (0.000) 
Experience squared -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000)  -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000)  -0.001*** (0.000) 
Job Tenure   0.002 (0.209)   0.003 (0.159)   0.004** (0.027)  0.005*** (0.005)    0.003* (0.062)  -0.000 (0.852) 0.006*** (0.002) 0.004** (0.041) 
Postgraduate Qualification 0.482*** (0.000) 0.445*** (0.000)  0.283*** (0.000)  0.552*** (0.000)  0.549*** (0.000)  0.345*** (0.000) 0.238*** (0.000) 0.398*** (0.000) 
First Degree 0.408*** (0.000) 0.401*** (0.000)  0.378*** (0.000)  0.367*** (0.000)  0.379*** (0.000)  0.340*** (0.000) 0.265*** (0.000) 0.302*** (0.000) 
A-levels or HNC/HND 0.184*** (0.000) 0.185*** (0.000)  0.126*** (0.000)  0.164*** (0.000)  0.138*** (0.000)  0.101*** (0.004) 0.096*** (0.010) 0.090** (0.028) 
O-levels or GCSE 0.077*** (0.001)   0.065** (0.031) 0.060** (0.038)  0.083*** (0.005)    0.055* (0.086)   0.029 (0.449)    0.010 (0.821)   0.018 (0.696) 
Job Interruption -0.173*** (0.000) -0.213*** (0.000) -0.188*** (0.000) -0.192*** (0.000) -0.179*** (0.001)  -0.112** (0.035)  -0.103 (0.158)  -0.153* (0.098) 
Male Premium 0.249*** (0.000) 0.217*** (0.000)  0.242*** (0.000)  0.158***  (0.000)  0.175*** (0.000)  0.170*** (0.000) 0.140*** (0.000)  0.159*** (0.000) 
Marital Status 0.099*** (0.000) 0.088*** (0.000)  0.068*** (0.004)  0.074*** (0.001)  0.074*** (0.001)   0.013 (0.589) 0.077*** (0.002) 0.062** (0.019) 
Medium Employer Size 0.094*** (0.000) 0.128*** (0.000)   0.076*** (0.001)  0.155*** (0.000) 0.052** (0.018)  0.091*** (0.000) 0.101*** (0.000) 0.055** (0.040) 
Large Employer Size 0.148*** (0.000) 0.200*** (0.000)  0.127*** (0.000)  0.171*** (0.000)  0.123*** (0.000)  0.177*** (0.000) 0.141*** (0.000)  0.178*** (0.000) 
Collective Bargaining 0.119*** (0.000) 0.067*** (0.005)  0.115*** (0.000)  0.079*** (0.000)  0.110*** (0.000)    0.005 (0.847) 0.078*** (0.001)  -0.005 (0.855) 
Higher Professional occupations (traditional)  -0.144** (0.013) -0.275*** (0.000)  -0.141** (0.023) -0.209*** (0.000) -0.180*** (0.002) -0.214*** (0.001) -0.219*** (0.000) -0.208*** (0.001) 
Higher Professional occupations (new)  -0.133 (0.123)  -0.067 (0.374)  -0.199** (0.036)  -0.109 (0.123) -0.342*** (0.000) -0.207*** (0.004) -0.334*** (0.000) -0.215*** (0.001) 
Lower Professional occupations (traditional)  -0.141*** (0.005) -0.253*** (0.000)  -0.181*** (0.001) -0.230*** (0.000) -0.294*** (0.000) -0.214*** (0.000) -0.331*** (0.000) -0.229*** (0.000) 
Lower Professional occupations (new)  -0.258*** (0.008) -0.336*** (0.003)  -0.220** (0.022) -0.359*** (0.001) -0.265*** (0.004)  -0.155* (0.095) -0.371*** (0.000) -0.330*** (0.000) 
Lower Managerial occupations  -0.119** (0.027) -0.261*** (0.000) -0.197*** (0.000) -0.186*** (0.000) -0.268*** (0.000) -0.205*** (0.000) -0.286*** (0.000) -0.239*** (0.000) 
Higher Supervisory occupations -0.259*** (0.000) -0.423*** (0.000) -0.330*** (0.000) -0.392*** (0.000) -0.402*** (0.000) -0.421*** (0.000) -0.462*** (0.000) -0.432*** (0.000) 
Intermediate Clerical and Administration -0.406*** (0.000) -0.511*** (0.000) -0.410*** (0.000) -0.497*** (0.000) -0.557*** (0.000) -0.447*** (0.000) -0.593*** (0.000) -0.504*** (0.000) 
Intermediate Sales and Service -0.323*** (0.000) -0.460*** (0.000) -0.470*** (0.000) -0.461*** (0.000) -0.488*** (0.000) -0.414*** (0.000) -0.609*** (0.000) -0.513*** (0.000) 
Intermediate Technical and Auxiliary -0.512*** (0.000) -0.586*** (0.000) -0.491*** (0.000) -0.505*** (0.000) -0.621*** (0.000) -0.434*** (0.000) -0.565*** (0.000) -0.602*** (0.000) 
Intermediate Engineering -0.295*** (0.005)  -0.257** (0.043)  -0.224 (0.162) -0.487*** (0.000) -0.555*** (0.000) -0.578*** (0.000) -0.660*** (0.000) -0.521*** (0.000) 
Lower Supervisory occupations -0.390*** (0.000) -0.570*** (0.000) -0.471*** (0.000) -0.508*** (0.000) -0.480*** (0.000) -0.577*** (0.000) -0.574*** (0.000) -0.518*** (0.000) 
Lower Technical Craft -0.359*** (0.000) -0.488*** (0.000) -0.508*** (0.000) -0.463*** (0.000) -0.450*** (0.000) -0.580*** (0.000) -0.542*** (0.000) -0.408*** (0.000) 
Lower Technical Process Operative -0.357*** (0.000) -0.402*** (0.000) -0.496*** (0.000) -0.599*** (0.000) -0.466*** (0.000) -0.534*** (0.000) -0.491*** (0.000) -0.575*** (0.000) 
Semi-routine Sales -0.507*** (0.000) -0.777*** (0.000) -0.608*** (0.000) -0.605*** (0.000) -0.694*** (0.000) -0.627*** (0.000) -0.626*** (0.000) -0.729*** (0.000) 
Semi-routine Service -0.575*** (0.000) -0.750*** (0.000) -0.641*** (0.000) -0.679*** (0.000) -0.675*** (0.000) -0.709*** (0.000) -0.795*** (0.000) -0.703*** (0.000) 
Semi-routine Technical -0.399*** (0.000) -0.529*** (0.000) -0.442*** (0.000) -0.479*** (0.000) -0.538*** (0.000) -0.641*** (0.000) -0.647*** (0.000) -0.526*** (0.000) 
Semi-routine Operative -0.447*** (0.000) -0.637*** (0.000) -0.526*** (0.000) -0.590*** (0.000) -0.561*** (0.000) -0.638*** (0.000) -0.991*** (0.000) -0.589*** (0.000) 
Semi-routine Agricultural -0.757*** (0.000) -0.957*** (0.000) -0.549*** (0.001) -0.620*** (0.000) -0.948*** (0.000) -0.769*** (0.002) -0.927*** (0.000)  -0.114 (0.689) 
Semi-routine Clerical -0.422*** (0.000) -0.689*** (0.000) -0.429*** (0.000) -0.510*** (0.000) -0.626*** (0.000) -0.511*** (0.000) -0.715*** (0.000) -0.713*** (0.000) 
Semi-routine Childcare  -0.451** (0.020) -1.271*** (0.000)  -0.368 (0.140) -0.676*** (0.000) -0.724*** (0.000) -0.420*** (0.001) -0.795*** (0.000) -0.656*** (0.000) 
Routine Sales and Service -0.575*** (0.000) -0.868*** (0.000) -0.535*** (0.000) -0.747*** (0.000) -0.755*** (0.000) -0.656*** (0.000) -0.822*** (0.000) -0.765*** (0.000) 
Routine Production -0.519*** (0.000) -0.682*** (0.000) -0.708*** (0.000) -0.659*** (0.000) -0.682*** (0.000) -0.757*** (0.000) -0.973*** (0.000) -0.791*** (0.000) 
Routine Technical -0.474*** (0.000) -0.680*** (0.000) -0.621*** (0.000) -0.724*** (0.000) -0.636*** (0.000) -0.665*** (0.000) -0.730*** (0.000) -0.742*** (0.000) 
Routine Operative -0.513*** (0.000) -0.810*** (0.000) -0.589*** (0.000) -0.703*** (0.000) -0.734*** (0.000) -0.753*** (0.000) -0.864*** (0.000) -0.765*** (0.000) 
Routine Agricultural -0.794*** (0.000) -0.646*** (0.005) -0.836*** (0.000) -0.566*** (0.005)  -0.689** (0.039)  -0.722* (0.062) -0.855*** (0.001)  -0.432* (0.053) 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery and Mining 0.209*** (0.006)   0.089 (0.361)  0.252*** (0.002)    0.005 (0.951)    0.117 (0.287)   0.126 (0.324)    0.151 (0.202)  -0.342** (0.014) 
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 0.201*** (0.000)   0.062 (0.446)   0.106* (0.087)    0.059 (0.422)  -0.341 (0.137) 0.324** (0.040) 0.500** (0.038)  0.404*** (0.004) 
Manufacture Textile, Wood, Paper, Furniture 0.134*** (0.003)   0.158*** (0.005) 0.169*** (0.000)   0.137*** (0.007)    0.077 (0.212) 0.336*** (0.000)    0.095 (0.186)  -0.000 (0.999) 
Manufacturing of Chemicals, Oil and Metal 0.269*** (0.000)   0.183** (0.012) 0.305*** (0.000)    0.070 (0.245)  0.204*** (0.000) 0.238*** (0.000)    0.201*** (0.000)   0.062 (0.316) 
Manufacturing of Machinery  0.208*** (0.000)   0.128** (0.014) 0.303*** (0.000)  0.101** (0.032)  0.152*** (0.005) 0.199*** (0.001)    0.204*** (0.001) 0.176*** (0.004) 
Supply of Utilities, Waste and Recycling 0.247*** (0.000) 0.236*** (0.003) 0.277*** (0.000)    0.082 (0.292)    0.133 (0.106) 0.319*** (0.000)    0.135 (0.123) 0.285*** (0.002) 
Construction 0.221*** (0.000)   0.147** (0.037) 0.224*** (0.000)   0.210*** (0.006)  0.224*** (0.000) 0.259*** (0.000)  0.311*** (0.000) 0.299*** (0.000) 
Sales   0.083* (0.059)   0.130** (0.012) 0.142*** (0.002)   -0.020 (0.657)    0.045 (0.370)  -0.001 (0.985)   -0.001 (0.992)   0.027 (0.595) 
Transport 0.201*** (0.000)  0.190*** (0.001) 0.191*** (0.000)   0.189*** (0.000)    0.091* (0.092) 0.338*** (0.000)    0.129** (0.028) 0.249*** (0.000) 
Financial services 0.294*** (0.000)  0.323*** (0.000) 0.253*** (0.000)   0.205*** (0.000)  0.193*** (0.002) 0.341*** (0.000)    0.176*** (0.009) 0.304*** (0.000) 
Real Estate and Renting 0.245*** (0.006)   0.196* (0.085)   0.159 (0.144)    0.003 (0.971) 0.226** (0.018)   0.141* (0.073)    0.220** (0.010)   0.152* (0.059) 
IT   0.081 (0.512)   0.312** (0.021) 0.319*** (0.001)   0.318*** (0.000)  0.444*** (0.000) 0.327*** (0.000)    0.217** (0.011) 0.264*** (0.001) 
Professional and Business Services   0.371** (0.031)   0.154 (0.219)  0.587* (0.090)   -0.010 (0.925)    0.104* (0.058) 0.197*** (0.000)    0.136** (0.014) 0.188*** (0.000) 
Public Administration 0.207*** (0.000) 0.185*** (0.001) 0.237*** (0.000)   0.145*** (0.003)  0.146*** (0.008) 0.204*** (0.001)    0.147** (0.010) 0.176*** (0.002) 
Education 0.189*** (0.000)   0.101 (0.114) 0.187*** (0.001)   -0.002 (0.969) 0.125** (0.033)   0.108* (0.072)  0.166*** (0.005)   0.094 (0.109) 
Health and Social Work 0.152*** (0.001)  -0.033 (0.566) 0.132*** (0.007)   -0.078 (0.127)    0.091* (0.080)   0.080 (0.165)  0.166*** (0.001)   0.050 (0.370) 
Inverse Mills Ratio   0.073 (0.240)   0.104 (0.159) 0.142** (0.033)    0.058 (0.442)    0.099 (0.185)  -0.018 (0.827)   -0.124 (0.149)   0.054 (0.587) 
Intercept 1.521*** (0.000) 1.818*** (0.000) 1.624*** (0.000) 1.923*** (0.000) 1.977*** (0.000)  2.085*** (0.000) 2.107*** (0.000) 2.090*** (0.000) 
N 1583  1426  1423  1390  1283  1285  1179  1066  
R2 0.581  0.561  0.557  0.582  0.569  0.531  0.562  0.580  
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Table A.2/1. Oaxaca results  
 
1991   1992   1993   1994   1995   1996   1997   1998   1999   
Log of Mean Northern Wage 2.149  2.190  2.217  2.229  2.221  2.224  2.237  2.231  2.276  
Log of Mean Southern Wage 2.317  2.357  2.371  2.379  2.367  2.373  2.370  2.371  2.399  
Raw Difference 0.169  0.167  0.154  0.149  0.146  0.150  0.133  0.140  0.124  
Sample Selectivity Adjusted Difference 0.166  0.165  0.158  0.136  0.136  0.157  0.135  0.139  0.141  
interaction   -0.028 0% -0.018 0% -0.018 0% -0.012 0% -0.008 0% 0.000 0% -0.013 0% -0.009 0% -0.008 0% 
Endowment Effect 0.071 43% 0.047 29% 0.037 23% 0.027 20% 0.035 26% 0.033 21% 0.024 18% 0.039 28% 0.018 13% 
Experience  -0.002 -1% -0.004 -2% -0.004 -3% -0.003 -2% -0.001 0% -0.005 -3% -0.005 -3% -0.006 -4% -0.009 -6% 
Job Tenure -0.002 -1% -0.002 -1% -0.003 -2% -0.003 -2% -0.006 -4% -0.005 -3% -0.003 -2% -0.005 -3% -0.008 -6% 
Educational Attainment 0.021 13% 0.020 12% 0.015 9% 0.014 11% 0.015 11% 0.016 10% 0.009 7% 0.012 9% 0.007 5% 
  Postgraduate Qualification 0.002 1% 0.003 2% 0.002 1% 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.002 1% 0.002 1% 
  First Degree 0.004 3% 0.005 3% 0.003 2% 0.004 3% 0.005 4% 0.005 3% 0.003 2% 0.004 3% 0.002 1% 
  A-levels or HNC/HND -0.001 -1% -0.001 0% -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
  O-levels or GCSE -0.002 -1% -0.002 -1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% -0.001 -1% 
  None of the Above (including apprenticeships) 0.017 10% 0.016 10% 0.011 7% 0.010 8% 0.010 7% 0.011 7% 0.006 5% 0.007 5% 0.005 3% 
Male Premium 0.000 0% -0.003 -2% -0.002 -1% -0.004 -3% -0.006 -5% -0.002 -1% -0.002 -2% -0.002 -2% -0.001 -1% 
Collective Bargaining -0.006 -3% -0.007 -4% -0.008 -5% -0.005 -4% -0.011 -8% -0.008 -5% -0.003 -3% -0.003 -2% -0.001 -1% 
Employer Size -0.002 -1% -0.001 -1% 0.002 1% 0.000 0% 0.003 2% -0.003 -2% -0.004 -3% -0.002 -2% -0.002 -2% 
Marital Status -0.003 -2% -0.004 -2% -0.003 -2% -0.003 -2% -0.003 -2% -0.003 -2% -0.003 -3% -0.002 -1% -0.001 -1% 
Job Interruption 0.001 1% -0.001 -1% -0.002 -1% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.003 2% -0.001 0% 0.001 1% 0.001 0% 
Occupation 0.051 31% 0.041 25% 0.039 25% 0.023 17% 0.034 25% 0.033 21% 0.034 26% 0.044 32% 0.028 20% 
  Higher Managerial 0.010 6% 0.007 4% 0.009 6% 0.012 9% 0.007 5% 0.006 4% 0.004 3% 0.004 3% -0.001 0% 
  Higher Professional occupations (traditional) 0.002 1% 0.004 2% 0.003 2% 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 0.003 2% 0.004 3% 0.003 2% 0.001 1% 
  Higher Professional occupations (new) 0.007 4% 0.006 3% 0.002 1% 0.002 2% 0.005 3% 0.005 3% 0.006 4% 0.006 4% 0.007 5% 
  Lower Professional occupations (traditional) 0.006 4% 0.003 2% 0.002 1% 0.000 0% 0.005 4% 0.003 2% 0.003 2% 0.006 4% 0.005 3% 
  Lower Professional occupations (new) 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% -0.001 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
  Lower Managerial occupations 0.012 7% 0.009 6% 0.011 7% 0.005 3% 0.002 1% 0.005 3% 0.006 5% 0.009 6% 0.005 4% 
  Higher Supervisory occupations 0.002 1% 0.002 1% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.001 0% 
  Intermediate Clerical and Administration 0.001 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% -0.002 -1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
  Intermediate Sales and Service 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% -0.002 -1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
  Intermediate Technical and Auxiliary 0.000 0% 0.001 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 
  Intermediate Engineering 0.000 0% 0.001 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 
  Lower Supervisory occupations 0.001 0% 0.001 0% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 0% 
  Lower Technical Craft -0.001 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% -0.001 0% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
  Lower Technical Process Operative -0.001 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% -0.001 -1% 
  Semi-routine Sales 0.000 0% -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% -0.001 -1% -0.003 -2% -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 0% 
  Semi-routine Service 0.000 0% 0.000 0% -0.001 0% -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 0% -0.001 0% 
  Semi-routine Technical 0.000 0% -0.002 -2% 0.000 0% -0.003 -2% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 
  Semi-routine Operative 0.001 1% 0.002 1% 0.001 0% 0.001 1% 0.002 1% 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 0.002 1% 
  Semi-routine Agricultural -0.002 -1% -0.003 -2% -0.001 -1% -0.002 -1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
  Semi-routine Clerical 0.000 0% -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% -0.002 -1% -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 0% 
  Semi-routine Childcare 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% -0.001 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
  Routine Sales and Service -0.001 -1% -0.002 -1% -0.001 0% -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
  Routine Production 0.001 1% 0.006 3% 0.002 1% 0.008 6% 0.005 3% 0.004 2% 0.003 2% 0.002 2% 0.003 2% 
  Routine Technical 0.006 4% 0.006 3% 0.008 5% 0.008 6% 0.009 7% 0.007 4% 0.005 4% 0.006 4% 0.005 3% 
  Routine Operative 0.005 3% 0.003 2% 0.001 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.001 0% 0.001 1% 0.007 5% 0.001 1% 
  Routine Agricultural 0.000 0% 0.001 0% 0.001 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% -0.001 -1% -0.002 -2% -0.002 -1% 
Industry  0.013 8% 0.009 5% 0.002 1% 0.007 5% 0.010 7% 0.006 4% 0.002 1% 0.001 1% 0.005 4% 
  Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery and Mining 0.000 0% 0.000 0% -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
  Food, Beverages and Tobacco 0.001 1% 0.002 1% -0.001 0% 0.002 1% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
  Manufacture of Textile, Wood, Paper, Furniture 0.000 0% -0.004 -2% -0.003 -2% -0.002 -2% -0.002 -1% -0.002 -1% -0.001 -1% -0.002 -1% -0.001 0% 
  Manufacturing of Chemicals, Oil and Metal -0.002 -1% 0.000 0% 0.002 1% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.001 0% -0.001 -1% -0.004 -3% -0.002 -2% 
  Manufacturing of Machinery  0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
  Supply of Utilities, Waste and Recycling 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
  Construction 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% -0.001 -1% -0.002 -1% -0.001 -1% -0.001 0% 0.000 0% 
  Sales 0.000 0% -0.002 -1% -0.004 -2% -0.003 -2% -0.001 -1% -0.003 -2% -0.002 -2% 0.001 1% 0.001 0% 
  Hospitality, Entertainment and Personal services -0.001 -1% -0.002 -1% -0.002 -1% -0.002 -1% 0.000 0% 0.001 0% -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% 
  Transport 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% -0.001 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
  Financial services 0.012 7% 0.009 5% 0.006 4% 0.007 5% 0.009 6% 0.007 5% 0.005 4% 0.007 5% 0.008 6% 
  Real Estate and Renting 0.000 0% 0.001 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
  IT 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 0.002 1% 0.002 1% 0.001 1% 0.002 1% 0.001 1% 
  Professional and Business Services 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% -0.001 0% -0.001 0% -0.001 -1% -0.001 0% 0.000 0% 
  Public Administration 0.001 1% 0.002 1% 0.002 1% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.001 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
  Education 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 0% 0.000 0% -0.001 0% -0.001 0% 
  Health and Social Work 0.002 1% 0.001 1% 0.002 1% 0.003 2% 0.002 2% 0.002 1% 0.002 1% 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 
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Table A.2/2 1991   1992   1993   1994   1995   1996   1997   1998   1999   
Log of Mean Northern Wage 2.149  2.190  2.217  2.229  2.221  2.224  2.237  2.231  2.276  
Log of Mean Southern Wage 2.317  2.357  2.371  2.379  2.367  2.373  2.370  2.371  2.399  
Raw Difference 0.169  0.167  0.154  0.149  0.146  0.150  0.133  0.140  0.124  
Sample Selectivity Adjusted Difference 0.166  0.165  0.158  0.136  0.136  0.157  0.135  0.139  0.141  
                   
Coefficient Effect 0.123 74% 0.136 82% 0.140 88% 0.120 88% 0.109 80% 0.124 79% 0.123 91% 0.109 79% 0.131 93% 
Experience  0.021 12% -0.060 -37% -0.130 -82% 0.017 12% -0.053 -39% -0.039 -25% -0.006 -4% 0.034 24% 0.002 1% 
Job Tenure 0.004 3% 0.003 2% 0.012 8% -0.005 -3% 0.019 14% 0.007 4% 0.004 3% 0.007 5% 0.020 14% 
Educational Attainment 0.007 4% -0.016 -10% 0.000 0% 0.002 2% -0.006 -5% -0.039 -25% -0.012 -9% -0.004 -3% 0.006 5% 
 Postgraduate Qualification -0.001 0% 0.002 1% 0.001 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.006 4% 0.003 2% 0.001 0% -0.002 -1% 
 First Degree 0.000 0% -0.001 0% -0.006 -4% -0.007 -5% -0.003 -2% -0.013 -8% -0.008 -6% 0.003 3% 0.005 4% 
 A-levels or HNC/HND 0.004 2% -0.003 -2% 0.008 5% 0.001 1% -0.006 -4% -0.010 -6% 0.001 1% -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% 
 O-levels or GCSE 0.000 0% -0.009 -5% -0.014 -9% 0.001 1% 0.002 1% -0.009 -6% -0.004 -3% -0.002 -2% 0.003 2% 
 None of the Above (including apprenticeships) 0.003 2% -0.006 -3% 0.011 7% 0.007 5% -0.001 -1% -0.013 -8% -0.004 -3% -0.005 -3% 0.000 0% 
Male Premium -0.019 -12% -0.037 -23% -0.025 -16% -0.013 -10% 0.005 4% -0.050 -32% 0.015 11% 0.003 2% -0.025 -17% 
Collective Bargaining -0.027 -16% -0.021 -13% -0.019 -12% -0.031 -23% -0.016 -12% -0.016 -10% -0.039 -29% -0.013 -9% -0.016 -11% 
Employer Size -0.001 -1% -0.008 -5% -0.012 -8% -0.006 -4% -0.004 -3% 0.008 5% -0.002 -2% -0.005 -4% -0.008 -6% 
Marital Status -0.008 -5% 0.013 8% -0.006 -4% 0.000 0% 0.025 19% 0.004 3% -0.015 -11% -0.028 -20% -0.063 -44% 
Job Interruption -0.002 -1% 0.007 4% -0.001 0% -0.002 -1% -0.002 -2% 0.000 0% 0.005 4% 0.001 1% -0.004 -3% 
Occupation 0.021 13% 0.012 7% 0.049 31% 0.030 22% 0.019 14% 0.012 7% 0.033 25% 0.047 34% 0.019 13% 
 Higher Managerial 0.009 6% 0.001 1% 0.003 2% 0.007 5% 0.006 5% 0.003 2% -0.002 -1% 0.004 3% 0.000 0% 
 Higher Professional occupations (traditional) 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.004 3% 0.000 0% 0.004 3% -0.001 -1% 0.004 3% 0.001 0% 0.001 1% 
 Higher Professional occupations (new) 0.006 4% 0.002 1% 0.004 3% 0.003 2% -0.002 -1% 0.004 2% 0.002 1% 0.001 1% 0.006 4% 
 Lower Professional occupations (traditional) 0.006 4% 0.005 3% -0.001 -1% 0.008 6% 0.005 4% 0.001 0% 0.003 2% 0.010 8% 0.000 0% 
 Lower Professional occupations (new) 0.001 0% 0.001 1% -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% -0.001 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
 Lower Managerial occupations 0.001 1% 0.010 6% 0.023 14% 0.015 11% 0.011 8% 0.008 5% 0.013 9% 0.011 8% 0.007 5% 
 Higher Supervisory occupations -0.001 0% -0.002 -1% 0.005 3% 0.005 3% -0.003 -2% 0.000 0% -0.001 0% 0.003 2% 0.000 0% 
 Intermediate Clerical and Administration 0.006 4% -0.001 0% 0.009 6% -0.003 -2% 0.003 2% -0.004 -2% 0.007 5% 0.007 5% 0.000 0% 
 Intermediate Sales and Service 0.001 0% 0.000 0% 0.004 2% 0.007 5% -0.002 -2% 0.003 2% 0.001 0% 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 
 Intermediate Technical and Auxiliary 0.001 1% 0.002 1% -0.001 0% 0.000 0% 0.004 3% 0.001 0% 0.000 0% 0.002 1% 0.004 3% 
 Intermediate Engineering 0.001 1% -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% 0.002 1% -0.002 -1% 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 
 Lower Supervisory occupations -0.002 -1% -0.006 -4% -0.005 -3% 0.000 0% -0.001 -1% 0.001 1% -0.002 -1% 0.004 3% -0.004 -2% 
 Lower Technical Craft 0.001 1% 0.001 0% -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% -0.001 0% 0.004 2% -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% -0.002 -2% 
 Lower Technical Process Operative 0.001 1% 0.002 1% 0.000 0% 0.002 1% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 
 Semi-routine Sales -0.002 -1% 0.000 0% 0.006 4% 0.000 0% 0.003 2% 0.001 1% 0.003 3% 0.002 1% 0.000 0% 
 Semi-routine Service -0.001 0% 0.002 1% 0.002 1% -0.003 -2% -0.002 -1% 0.001 0% 0.004 3% 0.006 4% 0.002 2% 
 Semi-routine Technical 0.000 0% 0.002 1% 0.001 1% 0.003 2% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% -0.001 -1% 
 Semi-routine Operative -0.001 0% -0.001 0% 0.000 0% -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
 Semi-routine Agricultural 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.003 2% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 
 Semi-routine Clerical -0.001 -1% 0.001 1% -0.001 -1% -0.003 -2% -0.004 -3% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.002 1% 0.003 2% 
 Semi-routine Childcare -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% -0.002 -1% -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% -0.001 0% 0.000 0% 
 Routine Sales and Service -0.002 -1% -0.002 -1% 0.000 0% 0.001 0% -0.001 -1% -0.002 -1% 0.001 1% 0.003 2% 0.001 0% 
 Routine Production 0.000 0% -0.002 -1% -0.001 -1% -0.002 -2% -0.001 -1% 0.001 1% -0.001 0% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 
 Routine Technical -0.002 -1% -0.001 -1% -0.002 -1% -0.004 -3% -0.003 -2% -0.002 -1% 0.003 2% -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% 
 Routine Operative -0.003 -2% 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% -0.001 0% -0.002 -1% 0.000 0% -0.004 -3% 0.002 1% 
 Routine Agricultural 0.001 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 0% -0.001 -1% -0.004 -3% -0.003 -2% 
Industry  0.013 8% 0.032 19% 0.013 8% 0.006 4% 0.042 31% 0.028 18% 0.026 19% -0.015 -11% 0.002 1% 
 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery and Mining -0.002 -1% 0.000 0% 0.001 0% -0.003 -2% 0.000 0% -0.002 -1% 0.001 0% 0.000 0% -0.003 -2% 
 Food, Beverages and Tobacco -0.002 -1% -0.002 -1% 0.002 1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.002 1% 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 0.003 2% 
 Manufacture of Textile, Wood, Paper, Furniture 0.005 3% 0.010 6% 0.008 5% 0.008 6% 0.008 6% 0.008 5% 0.008 6% 0.005 4% 0.004 2% 
 Manufacturing of Chemicals, Oil and Metal -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% -0.004 -2% -0.002 -2% -0.002 -2% -0.003 -2% -0.002 -1% -0.001 0% 0.000 0% 
 Manufacturing of Machinery  -0.004 -3% -0.003 -2% -0.003 -2% -0.007 -5% 0.002 1% -0.006 -4% 0.003 2% -0.003 -2% 0.000 0% 
 Supply of Utilities, Waste and Recycling 0.001 0% -0.001 -1% -0.002 -1% -0.001 -1% -0.002 -1% -0.001 -1% 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 
 Construction -0.001 -1% 0.001 0% -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% 0.002 1% 0.002 2% 0.001 1% 0.003 2% 0.002 2% 
 Sales 0.011 7% 0.004 2% -0.008 -5% -0.012 -9% 0.005 3% -0.003 -2% -0.009 -7% -0.006 -5% -0.001 -1% 
 Hospitality, Entertainment and Personal services 0.003 2% 0.004 3% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.009 7% 0.012 7% 0.005 4% -0.002 -2% 0.003 2% 
 Transport 0.002 1% 0.018 11% 0.013 8% 0.012 9% 0.008 6% 0.010 6% 0.008 6% 0.000 0% 0.003 2% 
 Financial services 0.011 7% 0.009 5% 0.004 3% 0.005 3% 0.010 7% 0.014 9% 0.012 9% 0.008 6% 0.010 7% 
 Real Estate and Renting 0.000 0% -0.002 -1% -0.002 -1% -0.002 -1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.002 1% 0.000 0% 
 IT 0.002 1% 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 0.002 1% 0.000 0% 0.003 2% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 
 Professional and Business Services -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% -0.003 -2% -0.004 -3% -0.003 -2% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
 Public Administration 0.002 1% 0.008 5% 0.006 4% 0.008 6% 0.005 4% 0.005 3% 0.007 5% -0.004 -3% 0.002 2% 
 Education -0.003 -2% -0.003 -2% 0.005 3% 0.002 2% 0.003 2% -0.003 -2% 0.000 0% -0.007 -5% -0.008 -6% 
 Health and Social Work -0.011 -6% -0.009 -6% -0.008 -5% -0.004 -3% -0.001 -1% -0.005 -3% -0.006 -4% -0.014 -10% -0.014 -10% 
Intercept  0.115 69% 0.210 127% 0.259 163% 0.122 90% 0.080 58% 0.209 133% 0.113 84% 0.082 59% 0.198 140% 
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Table A.2/3 2000   2001   2002   2003   2004   2005   2006   2007   2008   
Log of Mean Northern Wage 2.290  2.312  2.368  2.376  2.394  2.393  2.404  2.406  2.397  
Log of Mean Southern Wage 2.413  2.428  2.505  2.497  2.508  2.520  2.521  2.514  2.527  
Raw Difference 0.124  0.116  0.138  0.121  0.114  0.127  0.117  0.108  0.130  
Sample Selectivity Adjusted Difference 0.127  0.116  0.146  0.126  0.107  0.126  0.107  0.099  0.117  
interaction   -0.012 0% -0.010 0% -0.017 0% -0.012 0% -0.005 0% -0.002 0% -0.021 0% -0.005 0% -0.020 0% 
Endowment Effect 0.033 26% 0.013 12% 0.026 18% 0.015 12% 0.004 4% 0.008 6% 0.002 2% 0.014 14% 0.033 28% 
Experience  -0.011 -8% -0.017 -15% -0.016 -11% -0.018 -14% -0.015 -14% -0.011 -9% -0.011 -11% -0.011 -11% -0.003 -2% 
Job Tenure -0.002 -1% -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% -0.003 -3% -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
Educational Attainment 0.010 8% 0.005 5% 0.008 5% 0.009 7% 0.005 5% 0.004 4% 0.002 2% 0.010 10% 0.002 2% 
  Postgraduate Qualification 0.002 2% 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 0.002 2% 0.003 2% 0.002 2% 0.002 2% -0.001 -1% 
  First Degree 0.003 3% 0.003 2% 0.003 2% 0.003 3% 0.002 2% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.005 5% 0.002 2% 
  A-levels or HNC/HND 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.002 1% 0.000 0% 0.002 2% 0.001 1% 
  O-levels or GCSE -0.001 -1% -0.003 -2% -0.002 -1% 0.000 0% -0.003 -2% -0.003 -2% 0.000 0% 0.002 2% -0.001 -1% 
  None of the Above (including apprenticeships) 0.004 3% 0.004 3% 0.005 3% 0.005 4% 0.002 2% 0.002 1% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 
Male Premium -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% 0.003 2% 0.000 0% -0.002 -2% -0.001 0% -0.002 -2% -0.005 -5% 0.001 1% 
Collective Bargaining -0.003 -2% -0.003 -2% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% -0.001 -1% 0.002 2% -0.002 -2% 0.000 0% 
Employer Size -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% 0.002 1% 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% -0.001 -1% -0.005 -5% 0.000 0% 
Marital Status 0.000 0% -0.002 -2% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% -0.001 -1% -0.003 -2% -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% 
Job Interruption 0.000 0% 0.001 1% -0.001 -1% -0.002 -2% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
Occupation 0.040 31% 0.023 20% 0.033 23% 0.028 22% 0.023 22% 0.016 12% 0.012 11% 0.022 22% 0.025 22% 
  Higher Managerial 0.004 3% 0.000 0% 0.002 2% 0.004 3% 0.001 1% -0.001 -1% -0.004 -4% -0.001 -1% 0.007 6% 
  Higher Professional occupations (traditional) 0.004 3% 0.002 2% 0.002 1% 0.006 4% -0.001 -1% 0.004 3% -0.002 -2% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 
  Higher Professional occupations (new) 0.004 3% 0.005 4% 0.003 2% 0.005 4% 0.005 5% 0.005 4% 0.004 4% 0.004 4% 0.005 5% 
  Lower Professional occupations (traditional) 0.001 1% -0.001 -1% 0.003 2% -0.003 -3% -0.001 -1% -0.002 -2% 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 
  Lower Professional occupations (new) 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.004 3% 0.003 3% 0.002 2% 0.001 0% 
  Lower Managerial occupations 0.007 5% 0.006 5% 0.007 5% 0.007 6% 0.007 7% 0.004 4% 0.006 6% 0.008 8% 0.005 4% 
  Higher Supervisory occupations 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
  Intermediate Clerical and Administration 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
  Intermediate Sales and Service 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
  Intermediate Technical and Auxiliary 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% -0.001 0% 
  Intermediate Engineering 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
  Lower Supervisory occupations 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 0.002 1% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
  Lower Technical Craft 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% -0.001 -1% 0.001 1% -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% 
  Lower Technical Process Operative 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
  Semi-routine Sales 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% -0.002 -2% -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% 
  Semi-routine Service 0.002 1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.002 1% 
  Semi-routine Technical 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 
  Semi-routine Operative -0.003 -2% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.002 1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
  Semi-routine Agricultural 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
  Semi-routine Clerical 0.000 0% -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 
  Semi-routine Childcare 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
  Routine Sales and Service 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.001 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.001 0% 
  Routine Production 0.004 3% 0.002 2% 0.003 2% 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
  Routine Technical 0.009 7% 0.005 4% 0.005 4% 0.003 3% 0.006 5% 0.001 1% 0.003 2% 0.003 4% 0.004 3% 
  Routine Operative 0.002 1% 0.001 1% 0.002 1% 0.002 1% 0.003 3% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.002 2% 0.003 3% 
  Routine Agricultural 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% -0.001 -1% -0.002 -2% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
Industry  0.000 0% 0.008 7% -0.001 -1% 0.002 2% -0.005 -5% 0.004 3% 0.004 4% 0.005 5% 0.008 7% 
  Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery and Mining 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 
  Food, Beverages and Tobacco 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 
  Manufacture of Textile, Wood, Paper, Furniture -0.001 -1% 0.001 1% -0.003 -2% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.002 2% 
  Manufacturing of Chemicals, Oil and Metal -0.005 -4% -0.002 -2% -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% -0.001 -1% 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 0.002 2% 
  Manufacturing of Machinery  0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
  Supply of Utilities, Waste and Recycling 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% -0.001 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
  Construction 0.000 0% 0.000 0% -0.001 0% -0.002 -2% -0.005 -5% -0.006 -5% -0.007 -7% -0.005 -5% -0.003 -3% 
  Sales -0.001 0% 0.002 2% 0.001 1% -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% -0.002 -2% -0.003 -3% -0.001 -1% 
  Hospitality, Entertainment and Personal services -0.001 -1% -0.002 -2% -0.002 -1% -0.005 -4% -0.005 -5% -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% -0.003 -2% 
  Transport 0.000 0% -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% -0.001 -1% -0.001 0% 
  Financial services 0.006 5% 0.005 5% 0.004 3% 0.007 5% 0.004 4% 0.005 4% 0.006 6% 0.004 4% 0.004 3% 
  Real Estate and Renting -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
  IT 0.002 1% 0.002 2% 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 0.002 2% 0.002 2% 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 
  Professional and Business Services -0.001 -1% 0.002 2% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 
  Public Administration 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
  Education -0.001 0% -0.002 -2% -0.002 -1% 0.000 0% -0.001 -1% -0.001 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
  Health and Social Work 0.003 2% 0.003 3% 0.004 3% 0.003 3% 0.004 3% 0.005 4% 0.004 4% 0.005 5% 0.004 3% 
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Table A.2/4 2000   2001   2002   2003   2004   2005   2006   2007   2008   
Log of Mean Northern Wage 2.290  2.312  2.368  2.376  2.394  2.393  2.404  2.406  2.397  
Log of Mean Southern Wage 2.413  2.428  2.505  2.497  2.508  2.520  2.521  2.514  2.527  
Raw Difference 0.124  0.116  0.138  0.121  0.114  0.127  0.117  0.108  0.130  
Sample Selectivity Adjusted Difference 0.127  0.116  0.146  0.126  0.107  0.126  0.107  0.099  0.117  
                      
Coefficient Effect 0.106 83% 0.113 97% 0.137 94% 0.123 97% 0.107 100% 0.120 96% 0.126 117% 0.091 91% 0.105 89% 
Experience  0.025 20% -0.010 -9% 0.056 38% 0.060 47% 0.078 73% 0.067 53% 0.118 110% 0.122 124% 0.109 93% 
Job Tenure -0.008 -6% -0.010 -8% -0.014 -10% 0.004 4% 0.003 3% -0.003 -2% -0.013 -13% -0.011 -11% -0.009 -8% 
Educational Attainment 0.004 3% 0.030 26% 0.024 17% -0.007 -6% -0.015 -14% -0.021 -17% -0.022 -20% -0.032 -32% -0.027 -23% 
 Postgraduate Qualification -0.001 -1% -0.005 -4% -0.005 -4% -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% 0.003 2% 0.003 3% 0.004 4% 0.005 4% 
 First Degree 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.004 3% 0.006 5% 0.000 0% 0.002 1% -0.002 -2% -0.012 -12% -0.001 0% 
 A-levels or HNC/HND -0.001 -1% 0.019 16% 0.011 8% -0.015 -12% -0.016 -15% -0.019 -15% -0.021 -20% -0.025 -25% -0.024 -20% 
 O-levels or GCSE 0.001 1% 0.003 3% 0.006 4% -0.003 -2% -0.010 -10% -0.011 -9% -0.001 -1% -0.002 -2% -0.004 -4% 
 None of the Above (including apprenticeships) 0.006 5% 0.011 9% 0.008 5% 0.006 4% 0.012 11% 0.004 3% 0.000 0% 0.003 3% -0.004 -3% 
Male Premium 0.000 0% -0.024 -21% -0.003 -2% -0.036 -29% 0.019 18% -0.012 -9% -0.004 -4% 0.010 10% 0.011 9% 
Collective Bargaining -0.018 -14% -0.021 -18% -0.046 -31% -0.038 -30% -0.027 -26% -0.030 -24% -0.034 -32% -0.010 -10% -0.037 -32% 
Employer Size -0.001 -1% 0.004 3% 0.000 0% -0.005 -4% 0.003 3% -0.015 -12% -0.006 -6% 0.002 2% -0.011 -10% 
Marital Status -0.068 -53% -0.020 -17% -0.043 -30% -0.020 -15% 0.010 9% 0.015 12% -0.024 -22% -0.032 -32% -0.011 -10% 
Job Interruption 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.003 2% 0.002 2% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% -0.002 -2% 0.001 1% -0.001 -1% 
Occupation 0.012 9% -0.003 -2% 0.002 1% 0.024 19% -0.027 -25% 0.033 26% -0.010 -10% -0.022 -22% -0.047 -40% 
 Higher Managerial 0.002 1% 0.003 2% -0.002 -1% 0.006 5% 0.001 1% 0.003 2% -0.001 -1% -0.009 -9% -0.009 -8% 
 Higher Professional occupations (traditional) 0.000 0% -0.005 -5% -0.004 -2% -0.007 -6% -0.005 -5% -0.001 -1% -0.004 -4% -0.006 -6% -0.005 -4% 
 Higher Professional occupations (new) 0.003 2% 0.002 2% 0.004 3% 0.006 5% 0.001 1% -0.001 0% -0.001 -1% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 
 Lower Professional occupations (traditional) 0.007 5% -0.003 -2% 0.008 5% 0.001 0% -0.012 -11% 0.010 8% 0.003 2% 0.000 0% -0.002 -2% 
 Lower Professional occupations (new) -0.001 0% 0.002 2% 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 0.002 2% 0.004 4% 0.005 5% 0.002 2% -0.001 -1% 
 Lower Managerial occupations 0.005 4% 0.001 1% 0.004 3% 0.001 1% -0.002 -2% -0.004 -3% 0.010 9% 0.010 11% -0.009 -8% 
 Higher Supervisory occupations -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% -0.001 -1% 0.001 1% -0.003 -3% 0.001 0% -0.001 -1% -0.006 -6% -0.002 -2% 
 Intermediate Clerical and Administration 0.012 10% 0.002 1% 0.007 5% 0.003 2% 0.005 4% 0.006 5% 0.001 1% -0.001 -1% -0.002 -2% 
 Intermediate Sales and Service 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 0.003 2% 0.004 3% -0.003 -2% 0.003 2% -0.006 -6% -0.002 -2% -0.001 -1% 
 Intermediate Technical and Auxiliary 0.003 2% 0.001 1% 0.004 3% -0.002 -1% -0.002 -2% 0.005 4% -0.003 -3% -0.002 -2% -0.003 -2% 
 Intermediate Engineering 0.004 3% 0.000 0% -0.001 0% 0.003 2% 0.003 3% 0.003 2% 0.002 2% 0.002 2% 0.000 0% 
 Lower Supervisory occupations -0.007 -5% -0.001 -1% -0.008 -5% 0.002 2% -0.002 -2% -0.003 -2% -0.002 -2% -0.003 -3% -0.003 -3% 
 Lower Technical Craft 0.001 0% 0.000 0% -0.007 -5% -0.001 -1% -0.002 -2% 0.002 2% -0.004 -4% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 
 Lower Technical Process Operative -0.001 -1% 0.001 1% -0.001 -1% -0.001 0% -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% -0.001 -1% -0.002 -2% 
 Semi-routine Sales 0.000 0% -0.003 -2% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% -0.003 -3% -0.005 -5% -0.006 -5% 
 Semi-routine Service -0.003 -2% -0.002 -2% -0.003 -2% 0.003 3% 0.000 0% 0.003 2% -0.004 -3% -0.003 -3% -0.001 -1% 
 Semi-routine Technical 0.000 0% -0.001 -1% -0.002 -1% 0.002 1% -0.001 -1% 0.002 1% -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% 
 Semi-routine Operative -0.006 -5% 0.001 1% -0.002 -1% -0.002 -1% 0.001 1% 0.002 2% -0.001 -1% 0.001 1% 0.004 3% 
 Semi-routine Agricultural 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% -0.001 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 0% 
 Semi-routine Clerical 0.000 0% -0.002 -2% 0.001 1% 0.004 3% 0.001 1% 0.003 3% 0.001 1% 0.002 2% -0.001 -1% 
 Semi-routine Childcare 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.002 2% -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 
 Routine Sales and Service -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% 0.001 1% 0.001 1% -0.003 -3% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 
 Routine Production -0.001 0% 0.000 0% -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% -0.001 -1% 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 0.001 0% 
 Routine Technical -0.004 -3% 0.000 0% -0.003 -2% -0.001 -1% -0.007 -6% 0.002 1% -0.004 -3% -0.005 -5% -0.006 -5% 
 Routine Operative -0.001 -1% 0.002 2% -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
 Routine Agricultural -0.001 -1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% -0.004 -3% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 
Industry  0.017 13% -0.022 -19% -0.039 -26% -0.010 -8% -0.010 -9% 0.004 3% 0.025 23% 0.020 20% 0.028 24% 
 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery and Mining 0.000 0% 0.000 0% -0.001 -1% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% -0.004 -3% -0.001 -1% -0.004 -4% 
 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 0.005 4% 0.002 2% 0.003 2% 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% -0.002 -2% 0.000 0% 
 Manufacture of Textile, Wood, Paper, Furniture 0.010 8% -0.001 -1% 0.003 2% -0.002 -2% 0.000 0% -0.001 -1% 0.001 1% -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% 
 Manufacturing of Chemicals, Oil and Metal 0.003 2% -0.002 -2% -0.004 -3% 0.000 0% -0.004 -4% 0.001 1% -0.002 -2% -0.004 -4% -0.007 -6% 
 Manufacturing of Machinery  -0.003 -2% -0.004 -3% -0.004 -3% 0.003 2% -0.003 -2% -0.009 -7% 0.001 1% -0.002 -2% 0.000 0% 
 Supply of Utilities, Waste and Recycling 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.002 1% 0.000 0% 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 0.001 1% 0.004 4% 0.003 3% 
 Construction 0.002 1% -0.006 -5% -0.003 -2% -0.002 -1% 0.001 1% 0.003 3% 0.005 5% 0.005 5% 0.001 1% 
 Sales -0.001 -1% -0.008 -7% -0.017 -12% -0.011 -9% -0.003 -3% 0.001 1% 0.004 4% 0.004 4% 0.008 7% 
 Hospitality, Entertainment and Personal services 0.007 5% -0.002 -1% -0.006 -4% -0.005 -4% -0.001 -1% 0.002 2% -0.002 -2% -0.004 -4% 0.003 2% 
 Transport 0.006 5% 0.004 3% 0.011 8% 0.005 4% 0.007 7% 0.008 7% 0.014 13% 0.010 10% 0.010 8% 
 Financial services 0.008 6% 0.008 7% 0.004 3% 0.014 11% 0.007 7% 0.014 11% 0.012 11% 0.012 12% 0.010 8% 
 Real Estate and Renting 0.001 0% -0.002 -2% -0.004 -3% 0.002 1% -0.004 -3% -0.007 -5% -0.002 -2% -0.002 -2% -0.001 -1% 
 IT -0.002 -2% 0.000 0% -0.004 -3% -0.008 -6% -0.003 -3% 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 0.002 2% 
 Professional and Business Services -0.002 -2% 0.004 4% 0.000 0% 0.004 3% -0.001 -1% 0.001 1% 0.005 5% 0.007 7% 0.010 8% 
 Public Administration 0.002 2% 0.000 0% -0.002 -2% 0.005 4% 0.001 1% 0.007 5% 0.009 9% 0.006 6% 0.006 5% 
 Education -0.006 -5% -0.008 -7% -0.009 -6% -0.010 -8% -0.010 -9% -0.008 -7% -0.008 -8% -0.004 -4% -0.004 -3% 
 Health and Social Work -0.011 -9% -0.008 -7% -0.007 -5% -0.006 -5% -0.003 -2% -0.012 -9% -0.009 -9% -0.007 -7% -0.007 -6% 
Intercept  0.143 112% 0.191 164% 0.197 134% 0.148 117% 0.073 68% 0.082 65% 0.099 93% 0.042 42% 0.101 86% 
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Table A.3. JMP results 
North-South Log Wage Gap in 1991 0.169                     
North-South Log Wage Gap in 2009 0.130           
Effects    Pure Endowment   Endowment Weight  Pure Coefficient   Coefficient Weight 
Sample Selectivity Adjusted Log Gap -0.039  -0.039 -100%   0.001 2%   0.007 18%   -0.008 -20% 
                        
Experience   0.000 0%  0.000 0%  0.091 236%  0.000 0% 
Job Tenure   0.004 9%  -0.001 -3%  -0.014 -35%  0.000 -1% 
Educational Attainment  -0.012 -32%  -0.007 -17%  -0.034 -89%  0.000 -1% 
  Postgraduate Qualification  -0.003 -8%  0.000 0%  0.006 17%  -0.001 -2% 
  First Degree  -0.001 -3%  -0.001 -3%  -0.001 -3%  0.000 1% 
  A-levels or HNC/HND  0.004 10%  -0.001 -3%  -0.031 -80%  0.003 7% 
  O-levels or GCSE  0.000 0%  0.000 0%  -0.004 -10%  0.000 0% 
  None of the Above (including apprenticeships)  -0.012 -31%  -0.004 -12%  -0.005 -12%  -0.003 -7% 
Job Interruption   0.000 -1%  0.000 -1%  0.000 -1%  0.001 3% 
Male Premium   0.001 2%  0.000 0%  0.029 74%  0.001 4% 
Marriage Premium   0.001 3%  0.001 2%  -0.003 -7%  0.000 -1% 
Employer Size   0.001 3%  0.001 3%  -0.014 -36%  0.001 3% 
Collective Bargaining   0.000 0%  0.006 16%  -0.016 -42%  0.003 9% 
Occupation  -0.030 -77%  0.004 11%  -0.061 -158%  0.006 17% 
  Higher Managerial  -0.003 -7%  -0.001 -3%  -0.018 -46%  0.004 10% 
  Higher Professional occupations (traditional)  -0.002 -6%  0.000 0%  -0.007 -17%  0.000 0% 
  Higher Professional occupations (new)  0.001 3%  -0.003 -8%  -0.005 -13%  0.002 6% 
  Lower Professional occupations (traditional)  -0.006 -15%  -0.001 -2%  -0.010 -27%  0.003 7% 
  Lower Professional occupations (new)  0.000 1%  0.000 0%  -0.002 -5%  0.000 1% 
  Lower Managerial occupations  -0.006 -14%  -0.001 -3%  -0.009 -24%  0.001 2% 
  Higher Supervisory occupations  -0.001 -3%  -0.001 -3%  -0.002 -6%  0.000 0% 
  Intermediate Clerical and Administration  0.000 1%  -0.001 -2%  -0.006 -16%  -0.001 -2% 
  Intermediate Sales and Service  0.000 0%  0.000 -1%  -0.002 -5%  0.000 1% 
  Intermediate Technical and Auxiliary  -0.001 -2%  0.000 0%  -0.003 -7%  0.000 0% 
  Intermediate Engineering  0.000 0%  0.000 0%  -0.001 -2%  0.000 -1% 
  Lower Supervisory occupations  -0.001 -2%  0.000 0%  -0.002 -6%  0.001 3% 
  Lower Technical Craft  0.000 0%  0.000 -1%  0.000 -1%  0.000 -1% 
  Lower Technical Process Operative  -0.001 -2%  0.001 3%  -0.002 -5%  -0.001 -2% 
  Semi-routine Sales  -0.001 -2%  0.000 0%  -0.003 -7%  -0.001 -2% 
  Semi-routine Service  0.002 5%  0.000 0%  0.000 0%  0.000 -1% 
  Semi-routine Technical  0.000 -1%  0.001 2%  0.000 -1%  0.000 -1% 
  Semi-routine Operative  -0.002 -4%  0.000 0%  0.003 8%  0.001 2% 
  Semi-routine Agricultural  -0.001 -4%  0.003 8%  0.001 3%  0.000 0% 
  Semi-routine Clerical  0.001 2%  0.000 0%  0.000 0%  -0.001 -2% 
  Semi-routine Childcare  0.000 1%  0.000 0%  0.006 15%  -0.004 -11% 
  Routine Sales and Service  0.002 4%  0.000 1%  0.001 2%  0.000 1% 
  Routine Production  -0.003 -8%  0.002 4%  0.001 2%  0.000 0% 
  Routine Technical  -0.008 -20%  0.005 14%  -0.004 -12%  0.002 4% 
  Routine Operative  -0.002 -5%  0.000 0%  0.005 13%  0.001 3% 
  Routine Agricultural  0.000 0%  0.000 0%  0.000 0%  0.000 0% 
Industry  -0.002 -5%  -0.003 -8%  0.033 87%  -0.020 -51% 
  Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery and Mining  0.001 4%  -0.001 -2%  -0.004 -10%  0.001 2% 
  Food, Beverages and Tobacco  0.005 13%  -0.005 -14%  0.000 0%  0.003 9% 
  Manufacture of Textile, Wood, Paper, Furniture  -0.001 -2%  0.003 8%  -0.004 -11%  -0.005 -12% 
  Manufacturing of Chemicals, Oil and Metal  -0.002 -6%  0.006 15%  -0.006 -15%  0.000 -1% 
  Manufacturing of Machinery   0.001 2%  -0.001 -3%  0.002 6%  0.003 8% 
  Supply of Utilities, Waste and Recycling  0.000 0%  0.000 0%  0.003 7%  0.000 -1% 
  Construction  0.000 -1%  -0.003 -7%  0.003 9%  -0.001 -1% 
  Sales  0.001 2%  -0.002 -4%  -0.004 -9%  0.001 3% 
  Hospitality, Entertainment and Personal Services  -0.002 -5%  0.000 0%  -0.001 -2%  0.000 -1% 
  Transport  -0.001 -3%  0.000 1%  0.008 21%  0.000 0% 
  Financial services  -0.008 -20%  -0.001 -2%  0.003 9%  -0.003 -7% 
  Real Estate and Renting  0.000 0%  0.000 0%  -0.001 -1%  0.000 0% 
  IT  0.001 3%  0.000 0%  -0.004 -10%  0.004 11% 
  Professional and Business Services  0.001 2%  0.000 1%  0.024 62%  -0.016 -41% 
  Public Administration  -0.001 -2%  0.000 0%  0.004 10%  0.000 1% 
  Education  0.000 -1%  0.000 0%  0.001 1%  -0.001 -3% 
  Health and Social Work  0.003 8%  -0.001 -2%  0.008 19%  -0.007 -17% 
Intercept  0.000 0%  0.000 0%  -0.014 -37%  0.000 0% 
 
